A19/B33: "In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of cognition may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them . . . But intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us."
To say that intuition relates immediately to the object means that it represents the object without bringing it under a general concept.
Intuitions represent single objects, particulars, rather than groups of objects. It is general concepts which represent many single things under one heading.
Kant held that human intuition is sensible. That is, the objects of intuition are "given" to the mind, which is "affected" by them. Sensibility is the faculty of the mind which is affected by objects.
"Our mode of intuition is dependent upon the existence of the object, and is threfore possible only if the subjects' faculty of representation is affected by that object. . . . It is derivative (intuitus derivativus), not original (intuitus originarius) , and, therefore not an intellectual intuition" (B72).
It is conceivable that some minds have an intuition that is intellectual. It would represent objects immediately without being affected by them. Kant held that we do not know whether this is possible, since we do not know how it could occur. The only clue we have is that if there is a God or primordial being, it would have to have original intuition. The reason is that such a being's cognition must be intuitive, but it could not intuit anything sensibly, as this would be a limitation. (B71, cf. B138)