At B 142 Kant writes that the objective unity of apperception, in this case, judgment : is intended by "the copula is". How much weight did Kant put on the copula? Why would he make such a remark? Did Kant talk about the copula of traditional logic elsewhere in connection to objective judgment?
Kant carries on a conversation with J. S. Beck in an exchange of letters on May 31, 1792 and July 3, 1792 concerning the distinction between the connection of representations in the concept "the black man" and in the judgment "the man _is_ black." Beck's proposed distinction is more comprehensible than Kant's clarification. Beck says: "I say that the combination of representations in a concept differs from combination in a judgment in that the latter presupposes, in addition to the first synthesis, the further _activity_ of objective relation, that is, the very activity through which one thinks an object. It is in fact quite different if I say "the black man" or "the man is black," and I think one is not incorrect if one says that the representations in a concept are united in a subjective unity of consciousness, whereas those in a judgment are united in an objective unity of consciousness (Zweig, Kant's Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, p.191)." This passage and Kant's repsonse are the only two other passages that I am aware of where the significance of the copula "is" seems to play a role in the discussion. But I don't think that the point Beck is making , and that Kant seems to consent to, is the same point that Kant is making in the B 142 passage.
Beck is drawing a distinction between the unity of consciousness in a concept, which is subjective since anything qualifies as a concept as long as its marks (merkmale) are consistent, and the unity of consciousness in a judgment, which is objective in the sense that the unity is represented as occuring in some object and not merely in a concept. In the B 142 passage, Kant is drawing a disticntion between two types of judgment. The first is a subjective judgment where the representations are only referred to the subject as the locus of connection. The second is an objective judgment where the locus of connection is in the object, i.e., in the stone. Kant denies that the first type of judgment requires employment of the categories. It seems to me that this is false. The subject is being treated as the object in which the representations are united and that requires the use of the categories with respect to the subject. The only difference is that the first jugdment is about the subject: I judge that I have a constant relation of representation in me: the representation of the sun shining on the stone is always followed by the representation of warmth in the stone. Whereas the second judgment is about the object, i.e., the stone: I judge that the sun's shining on the stone causes the stone to be warm. This, I think, is a significance difference in the way the categories are employed and this difference deserves to be noted. But to treat anything as an object in which representations are united (including the subject), as opposed to the mere representation of the unity of representations in a concept, requires employment of the categories.
To restated it again using Kant's "judgment of perception/judgment of experience" terminology: judgments of perception treat the subject as the objective ground of the connection of representations, judgments of experience treat the object as objective ground of the connection of representations. Both differ from the merely subjective ground of connection of representations in the formation of concepts, and both require employment of the categories whereas concept formation does not.
[Actually, this does not quite represent my interpretation of Kant on this point. There is a certain sense in which categories are employed even in concept formation, since every coherent concept is the concept of at least a logically possible object, and representation of anything as an object requires employment of the categories. But drawing the distinction between these two ways of employing the categories would be extremely hard and I'm not going to attempt it here.]
It might be useful to look at Kant's Lectures on Logic. Kant taught logic for some forty years, I think. Norbert Hinske thinks that Kant's views on logic are fundamental for the critical philosophy.
Suggestion: It is easier to understand Kant in English if Vorstellung is translated as "idea" rather than as "representation," since Kant means by it exactly what all the philosophers from Descartes meant by "idea." Much discussion of Kant in English sounds odd because it is translationese. (E.g., "think an object" instead of "think of an object.")
For what Kant meant, I think you can find help in Hans Seigfried, "Kant's 'Spanish Bank Account': Realitaet and Wirklichkeit," in INTERPRETING KANT, edited by Moltke S. Gram (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1982), pp. 115-132. See also Hans Wagner, "Ueber Kants Satz, das Dasein sei kein Praedikat," in ARCHIV FUER GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, 53 (1971), pp. 183-186.
"But I don't think that the point Beck is making , and that Kant seems to consent to, is the same point that Kant is making in the B 142 passage. ...
"In the B 142 passage, Kant is drawing a disticntion between two types of judgment. The first is a subjective judgment where the representations are only referred to the subject as the locus of connection. The second is an objective judgment where the locus of connection is in the object, i.e., in the stone."
After reading B142 again, I'm not sure this is correct. B142 sounds more like what JD says Beck was saying afterall, namely:
"Beck is drawing a distinction between the unity of consciousness in a concept, which is subjective since anything qualifies as a concept as long as its marks (merkmale) are consistent, and the unity of consciousness in a judgment, which is objective in the sense that the unity is represented as occuring in some object and not merely in a concept."
Here's a key passage from B142:
"Only in this way [i.e., by virtue of "principles which are all derived from the fundamental principle of the transcendental unity of apperception"] does there arise from this relation a *judgement*, that is, a relation which is *objectively valid*, and so can be adequately distinguished from a relation of the same representations that would have only subjective validity -- as when they are connected according to laws of association."
I'm not absolutely clear about this, but it seems that in the A deduction, laws of association pertain to the "synthesis" of concepts, not judgments. Or are we not allowed to draw on the A deduction in interpreting B142?
In any case, Kant seems to connect objective validity exclusively with judgment earlier in the quoted passage. I don't see anything there about two kinds of judgment (objective versus subjective).
The examples in the prolegomena passage make it clear that Kant is not talking about mere concept formation. That sugar is sweet and wormwood bitter is something that occurs in the actual world and, as Kant admits, may not occur at all for some people with particularly peculiar sense organs. The only judgments that one can attempt with mere concepts are analytic - i.e., ones that concern the logical relations among concepts. Thus the disticntion at B142 is not between analytic and synthetic assertions but between two species of synthetic assertions. What Beck is referring to is the distinction between analytic and synthetic unities of consciousness.
The "copula" quote on B142 is as follows:
"...I find that a judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge (gegebener Erkenntnisse) are brought to the objective unity of apperception. This is what is intended by the copula 'is'. It is employed to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective."
I don't pretend to clearly understand this section, but it is interesting to note that the word translated as "copula" is in the original German "Verhaeltniswoertchen"---little relationship word. The preceding paragraph contains a footnote which refers back to Section 9 where the following quote can be found:
"The *modality* of judgments is a quite peculiar function. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it contributes nothing to the content of the judgment (for, besides quantity, quality, and relation, there is nothing that constitutes the content of a judgment), but concerns only the value of the *copula* in relation to thought in general.
The word "copula" in the above quote is the same in both English and German. Is there a connection between Kant's statement that a judgment consists in the manner in which knowledge is brought to the objective unity of apperception (quote #1) and the peculiar "modality" function of judgments (quote #2)?