Reid was traditionally known primarily as one of a group of anti-Humean Scottish philosophers of "common sense," along with such lesser lights as James Oswald and James Beattie. Kant criticized these philosophers particularly harshly (Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, Preface). Reid's reputation suffered along with that of his fellows, and it is only in the last half of the twentieth century that he has finally emerged as a philosopher to be taken seriously.
Until fairly recently Reid was best known for his account of the history of modern philosophy. According to Reid, Descartes replaced the ancient account of mind with a new one that contained the seeds of its own destruction. After Descartes, philosophers who adopted his main priniciple became more and more skeptical: Locke was more skeptical than Descartes, Berkeley than Locke, and Hume embraced universal skepticism. (See, for example, Inquiry, Conclusion.)
Although Reid was critical of all of these philosophers, he reserved his harshest criticism for Hume, while at the same time professing his admiration for Hume's logical powers. Writing of the system of the Treatise in the Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, Reid declared, "That system abounds with conclusions the most absurd that ever were advanced by any philosopher, deduced with great acuteness and ingenuity from principles commonly received by philosophers" (Essay I, Chapter 2). Reid summarily dismissed Hume's attempt to produce a positive account of the human understanding.
It seems to be a peculiar strain of humour in this author, to set out in his introduction by promising, with a grave face, no less than a complete system of the sciences, upon a foundation entirely new--to wit, that of human nature--when the intention of the whole work is to show, that there is neither human nature nor science in the world. (Inquiry, Chapter I, Section V)This view of Hume's Treatise was prevelant until the middle of the twentieth century, when commentators began to take Hume's "system of human nature" more seriously.
We begin our discussion of Reid with his account of the descent from the Cartesian theory of ideas to Humean universal skepticism, as Reid recounts it in the Conclusion of the Inquiry. (For the version found in the 1785 Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, click here.)
According to Reid, there are two ways of forming a conception of the human mind.
Reid credited Descartes with having broken free of analogical reasoning, at least to some extent. Descartes claimed that the mind is entirely distinct from the body, and that any "impressions" or "images" of objects are to be found in the body, not in the mind. When Descartes looked into his own mind (thus conceiving the mind properly), he found that he was essentially a thinking thing, a being endowed with understanding and will, both of which are not material.
But that is not the end of the story. For along with understanding and will, Descartes found his mind to be endowed with a faculty he called "sense" (though this was not strictly part of his essence). Sense is a passive faculty. When it senses, the mind is imprinted with ideas which are not the product of its will.
And here it is that Descartes made his fatal error. His description of the faculty of sense was the product of analogical reasoning, not of direct observation. The "ideas of sensation" are not literally images, such as those spread out upon the retina, but they are understood by analogy with images. And these alleged "ideas of sensation" form an impenetrable barrier between ourselves and the physical world.
Descartes himself did not reap the whirlwind that he had sown. Ultimately, ideas of sensation are treated by Descartes as being mere aids that allow us to avoid what harm us. The real knowledge of the world is gained through innate ideas, most notably that of God. The British philosophers cast off this safety net and wagered their fortune on experience alone. For Locke, all the materials on which the mind bases its judgments about the world beyond it are delivered through sensation. Locke argued that some of the ideas of sensation, the ideas of secondary qualities, do not resemble the qualities in the bodies which cause them. But Berkeley proved that the same reasoning applies to the ideas of primary qualities. His conclusion, according to Reid, followed inevitably from Locke's starting point: the only being we can attribute to bodies is being perceived.
Hume completed the descent into the absurd. Locke had held that our knowledge of the mind is gained through "ideas of reflection," as if the mind impressed images of its operations upon itself. Berkeley had realized that accepting Locke's view would leave him just as skeptical about the mind as he was about external bodies. So he backed away from the Lockean claim that we know all objects only through ideas and allowed that we can have knowledge of one's own mind in a way that does not require ideas as intermediaries. Hume, on the other hand, had no fear of skepticism and embraced the consequence that Berkeley wanted to avoid, that minds, just like bodies, consist of nothing but ideas. As he writes in the Introduction to the Inquiry:
as the Bishop [Berkeley] undid the whole material world, this author, upon the same grounds, undoes the world of spirits, and leaves nothing in nature but ideas and impressions, without any subject on which they may be impressed. (Inquiry, Chapter I, Introduction, Section V)This is the nadir of skepticism. Hume had descended into absurdity through impeccable reasoning from his starting point--Descartes's theory of ideas: "this scepticism is inlaid in it, and reared along with it" (Inquiry, Chapter I, Introduction, Section VII).
Reid thought that the absurd consequences of the theory of ideas are symptomatic of a deeper problem that affected all of modern philosophy. All the modern philosophers treated philosophy itself as autonomous or self-sufficient. More specifically, neither the premises nor the conclusions of the philosophers were sensitive to the principles of common sense. Philosophy chooses its own starting-points, and it decides whether the common-sense principles are justified or not. If they are not, then so much the worse for common sense!
It may be observed, that the defects and blemishes in the received philosophy concerning the mind, which have most exposed it to the contempt and ridicule of sensible men, have chiefly been owing to this--that the votaries of this Philosophy, from a natural prejudice in her favour, have endeavoured to extend her jurisdiction beyond its just limits, and to call to her bar the dictates of Common Sense.(Inquiry, Chapter I, Introduction, Section IV)Reid held that common sense will always win the contest with philosophy, "for, in reality, Common Sense holds nothing of Philosophy, nor needs her aid" (Inquiry, Chapter I, Introduction, Section IV). Indeed, it is philosophy that stands in need of the aid of common sense to keep it from falling into skepticism.
Philosophy . . . has no other root but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of them, and draws its nourishment from them. Severed from this root, its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots. (Inquiry, Chapter I, Introduction, Section VII)
On the other hand, it is easy to see why philosophers would be inclined to criticize a system that takes common sense as its starting point. The views of ordinary, non-philosophical people seem to be quite unreflective and indeed riddled with error. Philosophers have tended to view their task as being to rise above the common view of things and present a more lofty picture of the universe. Reid does not fall victim to this kind of criticism, however. His account of "common sense," as outlined in the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay VI, Chapter 2, was itself a philosophical one.
Reid begins by explaining what is "common" about "common sense." He thought that common sense is something which nearly all human beings have. The only ones who lack it are defective in some way, victims of "lunacy." A person who, through some natural mental defect, believes he is made of glass has departed from common sense. And a skeptical philosopher who does not believe that mind-independent bodies exist has similarly taken leave of common sense. The difference is that the philosopher abandons common sense not due to a mental defect, but rather due to the influence of metaphysical arguments. So Reid describes a skeptic as a victim of "metaphysical lunacy."
Now what about the "sense" of "common sense?" Here Reid had in mind what we now would call good judgment. When we say of a person that he "has no sense," we describe him as having a strong tendency to misjudge things. On the other hand, a sensible person is one who judges well. Reid regarded this as the fundamental meaning of "sense." He found such a notion in all languages and in all ages.
So nearly everybody has a tendency to make good judgments, at least about everyday matters. This can be seen in the fact that people carry on their day-to-day lives in a more-or-less competent way. But there is more to Reid's notion of common sense than this. Specifically, Reid saw common sense as belief in what is self-evident. We have the beliefs of common sense because God has endowed us with them. Whatever deviates from what is self-evident is, by definition, absurd. So, as Reid saw it, the kind of skepticism he found in Berkeley and Hume is absurd because it contradicts the beliefs of common sense.
It is important to be clear about what Reid meant when he called beliefs of common sense "self-evident." Evidence itself is "whatever is a ground of belief. To believe without evidence is a weakness which every man is concerned to avoid, and which every man wishes to avoid" (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay II, Chapter XX). Beliefs that are self-evident do not depend on anything but themselves as a source of evidence for their truth. Reid follows Aristotle in noting that if there are no self-evident first principles, there would be an infinite regress of reasons. To believe in first principles is as natural as swallowing, and needs as little instruction (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay IV, Chapter IV).
Self-evident beliefs can be divided according to whether they are about what is necessary (what is immutable, and whose contrary is impossible) or about what is contingent (what is mutable, and whose contrary is possible). Beliefs that are self-evident and necessary are called "axioms," and they include basic beliefs about mathematics. Such beliefs are infallible. "The light of truth so fills my mind in these cases, that I can neither conceive nor desire anything more satisfactory" (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay II, Chapter XX). Among the self-evident beliefs about necessary truths are the following:
What is contingent is the consequence of some will or power. Contingent self-evident beliefs thus admit of the possibility of doubt. In the case of the belief that I see an object before me, for example, "I seem to want [lack] that evidence which I can best comprehend, and which gives perfect satisfaction to an inquisitive mind" (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay II, Chapter XX).
A further distinction can be drawn in the domain of contingent self-evident beliefs. Some are quite general while others are particular. Reid called the former "first principles," including the following (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay VI, Chapter V):
In Essay II, "Of Judgment," of Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Reid presents his own theory of perception. We begin with Chapter V, "Of Perception." Perception is an operation of the mind, and as such it is observed directly. But it is only when one has attended to and reflected upon one's perceivings that one gets a "distinct notion" of the operation of perception.
Having attended to and reflected upon his own perceivings, Reid discovers three elements:
If the power of perceiving external objects in certain circumstances, be a part of the original constitution of the human mind, all attempts to account for it will be in vain. No other account can be given of the constitution of things, but the will of Him that made them. (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay II, Chapter V).He does give an account of the third feature of perception: if our belief were based on reasoning, it would not be present in small children who clearly have it. "The information of the senses is as perfect, and gives as full conviction to the most ignorant as to the most learned."
In addition to the perceiving mind, the operation of perception, and the perceived object, Reid recognizes a fourth element of perception of external objects: sensations. "Almost all our perceptions have corresponding sensations which constantly accompany them" (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay II, Chapter XVI).
Language is such that we often confuse sensations with qualities of perceived objects. Take the expression, "the scent of the rose." It might refer to a sensation "in the mind that feels it" or to a quality in the rose itself. Reid admitted that the sensations we have do not resemble anything in the perceived object, as was recognized by Berkeley.
He had a just notion of sensations, and saw that it was impossible that anything in an insentient being could resemble them; a thing so evident in itself, that it seems wonderful that it should have been so long unknown. (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of the Mind, Essay II, Chapter XVI)If sensation is identified with perception, then it would follow, as Berkeley understood, that our perception bears no resemblance to a material world, in which case the latter is disposable. But such an identification is an error: Berkeley took "one ingredient of a complex relation for the whole."
If there is no resemblance between our sensations and the objects of perception, then how do we know what qualities the objects of perception have? Reid's answer is found in the first element of perception of an external object: that it always contains a conception or notion of the object perceived. When this notion is "direct and distinct," as it is in the case of "extension, divisibility, figure, motion, solidity, hardness, softeness, and fluidity," then we perceive qualities in the perceived object just as they exist in the object (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay II, Chapter XVII). Thus Reid thought that Locke's notion of primary qualities has "a just foundation" for distinguishing them from secondary qualities.
Nonetheless, Reid saw a problem in Locke's treatment of primary qualities, since Locke claimed that they are known by sensation. Reid comments on Locke's description of the idea of solidity. Even if we could by a difficult abstraction isolate the feeling we get in squeezing a football (as in Locke's example), the feeling "is no more like hardness in a body, than the sensation of sound is like vibration in the sounding body" (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay II, Chapter XVII). The conception of hardness we do have is that of "such a cohesion of its parts as requires a great force to displace them."
The distinctness of our conceptions of primary qualities makes them amenable to scientific investigation. "Their various modifications are precisely defined in the imagination, and thereby capable of being compared, and their relations determined with precision and certainty" (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay II, Chapter XVII).
Our notions of the secondary qualities of the objects of perception are not so distinct as those of primary qualities, and hence "may be a subject of dispute." We do not know what the heat of the fire is, though we know that something in the fire causes our perception of its heat. Thus we have only a relative notion of the quality of heat: it is the cause of known effects. Reid was optimistic that future scientific investigation would reveal the true nature of the secondary qualities.
While sensations do not resemble the bodies that produce them, they nonetheless are the vehicles of our correct conceptions of bodies. Reid does not attempt to give any explanation of the manner in which sensations give rise to the corresponding conceptions.
Consider the sensations produced by my grasping an ivory ball in my hand. The sensation is not round and hard, yet I have a conviction that I am feeling a round, hard body. The connection is simply a design feature of the human being: "By the constitution of my nature, the sensation carries along with it the conception and belief of a round hard body really existing in my hand" (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay VI, Chapter V).
A final point concerns Reid's portrayal of Hume as an extreme skeptic. Hume acknowledged that his philosophy is very skeptical, but does it really depart from common sense? Hume explicity recognized that nature prevents us from being skeptics with respect to the independent existence of bodies for more than short periods of time. He conceded that the same kind of judgments Reid called "common sense" come naturally to the ordinary person.
Reid recognizes to some extent that Hume was not a total skeptic.
Indeed, he ingenuously acknowledges, that it was only in solitude and retirement that he could yield any assent to his own philosophy; society, like day-light, dispelled the darkness and fog of scepticism, and made him yield to the dominion of common sense. (Inquiry, Chapter I, Introduction, Section V; see Hume's Treatise, Book I, Part IV, Section 7)Hume's inability to remain skeptical was taken by Reid to be an inconsistency on his part and a demonstration of the weakness of philosophical reasoning in the face of common sense.
One difference between the philosophers is that Hume described our "natural" beliefs as being the fictitious products of the imagination, rather than as "a gift from Heaven" or a product of "the will of Him who made us." Hume was skeptical about any explanation of the human condition which appeals to the supernatural, especially when a wholly natural explanation can be given in its stead. It is better to recognize the extreme limitations of our power of judgment than to invent a divine basis for judgment which can never be proved to exist or even to be very probable. (See especially his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and Section XI of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.)
Reid, on the other hand, held that a belief in intelligent design is self-evident. Moreover, he thought that Hume's attempt to explain all the workings of the human mind by his meager three principles of association produces only a caricature of the human being (Inquiry, Chapter I, Introduction, Section VI). Hume, for his part, believed that with his principles he had properly accounted for all the phenomena of the human mind. This aspect of the debate between Hume and Reid, between a purely empirical account of man and one which situates him in a meaningful, created, universe, continues to the present day.
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