Version 2, October 24, 2005
Almost from its very inception, ancient Greek philosophy had skeptical tendencies. At the beginning of the fifth century B.C., Xenophanes questioned the popular anthropomorphic theology. He pointed out that the descriptions of the gods of other peoples did not match those of the Greek gods, and he conjectured that if animals had hands, they would draw images of gods that look like them. This is one of the earliest appeals to the relativity of beliefs as a way to undermine knowledge claims.
Regarding what is not evident to the senses, such as the nature of the gods, Xenophanes seems to have advocated a total skepticism. Even if one were to arrive at the truth of the matter by chance, he would still only believe and not know. Sextus Empiricus, who at the end of the ancient period produced compilations of skeptical arguments, illustrated the view with an analogy. A number of people in a dark room filled with treasures each pick up an object. Some of the objects are made of gold. While all may think that they have picked up an item of gold, none will know that he has.
A number of the early Greek thinkers, most prominently Heraclitus, were skeptical about beliefs obtained from the senses alone, unaided by reason. Here is how Sextus describes the view:
Sensation he convicts by saying expressly, "Ill witnesses for men are eyes and ears when they have barbarous souls," which is equivalent to saying "To trust in the irrational senses is the part of barbarous souls." And he declares reason to be the judge of truth--not, however, any and every kind of reason, but that which is "common" and divine. (Against the Mathematicians VII, 126).This is a common theme in subsequent epistemology. The information gathered through the senses must be evaluated for its truth or falsehood using reason.
Protagoras is well-known for his view that truth is relative. This claim is not in itself skeptical, but it contains the seeds of a skeptical argument. Protagoras seems to have thought that the properties of objects are relative to those who perceive them. Thus, it is not the case that the wind in itself is cold, but rather that it is cold only relative to someone who feels cold. If it is held that there is an absolute fact of the matter about whether the wind is hot or cold, then limiting our knowledge to the relative property amounts to skepticism. Later skeptics would take this line.
Democritus was famous for declaring that physical nature is composed of imperceptible atoms. If nature is atomistic, while the senses present nature as composed of continuous objects, then those of our beliefs which are based on sense-perception are false.
And Democritus in some places abolishes the things that appear to the senses and asserts that none of them appears in truth but only in opinion, the true fact in things existent being the existence of atoms and the void; for "By convention," he says, "is sweet, by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention color; but by verity atoms and void." (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians VII, 135)It is only general agreement or "convention" that moves us to take perceptual objects and their properties as real. But as others had recognized, there is little agreement among people in particular cases: honey appears to some as sweet and to others as bitter. The reason is that we perceive depends on the relation of our bodies to the perceived objects.
Democritus raised an interesting problem for his own view. On the one hand, we are to distrust the senses because of the relative character of the information they provide. But on the other hand, that very information provided by the senses is the basis of our rational knowledge of atoms and the void. One way to counter this criticism is to hold that atoms and void explain the very deceptive character of the appearances.
Socrates is famous for having professed his own ignorance, and on this basis he might be thought to be a skeptic. He said that he had looked for wisdom among all classes of people who had a reputation for having it: politicians, poets, and skilled craftsmen. The politicians proved not to know that which they boasted of knowing. The poets could not explain their own poetry. The craftsmen at least understood what they were doing, but they claimed knowledge of every other subject, which put them in a bad position. Socrates thought his position was superior to all the others, in that he was able to recognize his own ignorance (Apology, 21a-23c). This is not to say that knowledge is impossible, but only to counsel modesty in making claims to know.
One of the earliest advocates of general skepticism was Pyrrho of Elis, after whom the "Pyrrhonian" skeptical movement was named. The ties between Pyrrho and the later skeptics are somewhat tenuous, and it may be that he was more of an inspirational figure than a doctrinal influence. Some scholars have maintained that he learned his skepticism while in India.
Among Pyrrho's Western influences, we have Democritus and one of his followers, Metrodorus, who said, according to Sextus, "We know nothing, nor do we even know the very fact that we know nothing" (Against the Mathematicians VII, 88). Pyrrho also was influenced by Anaxarchus, who "likened real things to painted scenery, and supposed them to resemble the things that occur in sleep and madness" (Against the Mathematicians VII, 88).
Another important influence on Pyrrho was the Cyrenaics, whose founder, Aristippus, was a contemporary of Plato. Like others before them, the Cyrenaics were impressed by the relativity of beliefs based on sense-perception. They denied that we can have knowledge of objects through the senses, although they allowed that we can know how we are affected by objects. We are told, for example, that we are "whitened" and "sweetened" when we sense certain objects, but this is only a fact about ourselves.
The distinctive attitude of Pyrrho was that things are equally indifferent. He adopted the slogan (which had been used by his predecessors in other contexts) "no more this than that" (ou mallon, "no more," in Greek). He seems to have held that because neither sense nor judgment reveals the way things really are, there is no fact of the matter. Because the world is indeterminate both metaphysically and epistemologically, he advocated a suspension of judgment (epochē).
There is much controversy about the nature of Pyrrho's views, since all the information we have about him is second-hand because he wrote nothing. It may be that his skepticism was limited to cases of what we now call "value-judgments," such as whether a person is good or bad, an object beautiful or ugly. Moreover, if he believed that reality is indeterminate, then he was a negative dogmatist rather than a skeptic on that point.
Pyrrho's follower Timon lived mostly in the third century B.C. His view, which was to become standard for the Pyrrhonists, was to restrict our judgments to appearances. He is quoted as saying, "That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree it appears so." What we should resist making judgments about is what accompanies appearances but is not evident in the way they are. Timon cited the kind of examples invoked by the Cyrenaics, such as the apparent three-dimensionality of two-dimensional pictures. When we say that the picture really has only two dimensions, we stray beyond the appearances. Timon also criticized the use of hypotheses in geometrical reasoning, a subject also taken up by Plato.
After the death of Timon, Pyrrhonism ceased to be a viable intellectual movement. It was revived, probably in the first century B.C., by Anesidemus. He was a prolific author and is said to have been the first to call the adherents of the movement Pyrrhonists. He was concerned to distinguish his version of skepticism from that of some members of Plato's Academy, who will be discussed below.
As we saw in the last module, the Stoics had held that we gain knowledge through a special kind of "grasping" presentation that reveals objects just as they are. The Academic skeptics denied that there are any such presentations, and so denied that there is any knowledge. Aenesidemus found this position to be too strong. It is a negative dogmatism about knowledge, a claim to know that knowledge is impossible. This appears to be a paradoxical position to take. (It will he discussed further below.)
On the basis of relativity considerations, Aenesidemus agreed with the Academics that there is no reason to think there is a grasping presentation, and that without one there is no knowledge. We should therefore give up the exhausting and hopeless task of pursuing knowledge.
Aenesidemus's critics argued that his counsel should be ignored if he did not know that we are inescapably ignorant. He apparently devised a strategy to get around this criticism: we do know that we are ignorant, but only in a weaker sense of knowledge than the kind that was supposed to be conveyed by the grasping presentation. The sense of knowledge seems to be very weak indeed, since the Pyrrhonian is said to assent to it no more than to its denial. (It could be, though, that Aenesidemus had a very strong sense of "assent" in mind.)
A more bold approach would be to take the attribution to Aenesidemus at face value. Then the claim is that the Pyrrhonian determines nothing, not even the claim that nothing can be determined. If this is the view, then there is no answer to the critics. Perhaps then the Pyrrhonian is only offering himself as a model for others to copy. People can judge for themselves, as did Socrates, and when they explode the pretensions of those who claim to know, they too will suspend judgment.
One question that might arise is how the Pyrrhonian can argue against anyone without being able to assert any premises of a negative argument. Here we find a move that is characteristic of all brands of skeptics. The argument is conducted dialectically by granting the dogmatist's position for the sake of argument and showing how it leads to absurdities.
Sextus attributes to Aenesidemus ten "modes" or ways which lead to suspension of judgment. It may well be that Aenesidemus himself is not the author of these modes, but it is just as well that they be discussed here. The modes themselves are a mixed bag in terms of persuasiveness, but some of them have proved to be quite influential in subsequent theorizing about knowledge. Sextus describes the modes as being based on the following (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 14):
The first four modes all concern what does the judging. The first mode rehearses various differences in the sense-organs in animals. After describing them, Sextus has us allow for the sake of argument that the sense-perceptions of human beings are more to be trusted than those of animals. The second mode then notes variations in the constitutions of human beings, but grants for the sake of argument that there is some idealized human, such as the Stoic sage, whose sense-perceptions are trustworthy. The third mode notes that even the sage has different senses, and there is conflict among the sense-perceptions garnered from each of them. An object may appear visually to be three-dimensional but to the touch as two-dimensional.
Now suppose we settle on the perceptions of just one sense as being a trustworthy basis for judgment. The fourth mode appeals to the conditions under which one has perceptions. They may be natural, as in sense-perception, or unnatural, as with dreaming, where our perceptions do not refer to real objects. Similar remarks hold for cases of drunkenness or madness. A further case is perception of water, which feels lukewarm on some parts of the body but hot when poured over a sore. Many other examples are given.
At this point, the modes based on the relativity of the judger are completed. In each case, there is a general problem: how to choose from the different conflicting perceptions which is to be trusted. We shall return to this problem after describing the rest of the modes.
The second set of modes concerns characteristics of the objects to be judged. The seventh mode concerns the quantity and constitution of the objects. Typical examples are those of objects whose parts in isolation appear one color but when united in the whole appear to be a different color, as with the shavings of a piece of silver, which are black, while the original silver from which they are separated is whitish. Wine fortifies us when drunk in moderation but enfeebles us when drunk in large quantities. Descartes's famous example of a piece of wax that changes all its sensible qualities when melted would fall into this category.
The tenth mode is primarily concerned with ethical and religious judgments. Obviously there is a great deal of variation concerning what is customary for people to accept in these areas. What is legal in one place is opposed to what is customary or a way of life in another. Another area of widespread disagreement is in metaphysics. Some say the soul is mortal, others that it is immortal. Some say that human affairs are determined by actions of the gods, while others say that the gods play no role in human affairs.
What these examples all have in common is that the behavior of people is not uniform. If we are to try to decide what is the correct or "natural" way to behave, we lack an unbiased standard for doing so. The suspension of judgment based on this mode is very widespread in our present day under the guise of "cultural relativity," which claims that no culture has the right to judge from its own point of view regarding the practices of other cultures.
What Judges and What is Judged
The third set of modes concerns the situation of the objects that are judged in relation to the subject that perceives them. The fifth mode exploits the fact that "everything apparent is viewed in some location and from some distance and in some position" (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 14). For example, an object may look small from a distance and large up close, or an oar may appear straight when viewed in air but crooked when it is in the water. As with the previous modes, the claim is made that there is no way to choose which perception should be the preferred basis of judgment.
The sixth mode is based on the fact that in all cases, we do not perceive objects directly, but only through a medium such as the air or the fluid in our eyeballs. It may be the case as well that the conditions of our brain (and hence "the intellect") influence the way in which we perceive. Our judgments about how things appear, then, really should be about the combination or "admixture" of the object and the medium, and we should withhold judgment about the external object itself.
The eighth mode appeals to the fact that all external objects stand in relation to other objects. A number of arguments are advanced to support the claim of the relativity of objects. As with the sixth mode, we can judge how things appear in relation to one another (which involves the relation of those things to our perception, as the previous modes show) but not about how they are "in themselves."
The final mode is the ninth, based on how constantly or frequently things occur. If things occur regularly, like the setting of the sun, we take them for granted, but if they occur infrequently, like the setting of a comet, we treat them as marvels. Whether we regard something as precious depends on how frequently we encounter it. So we should make no judgments (other than about how things appear) about external objects, because our judgments are too heavily influenced by constancy and frequency.
The Problem of the Criterion
All the relativity that has been described would not undermine the reasonableness of our beliefs about external objects if there were a reasonable way to choose one of the conflicting points of view as revealing reality. The problem is to discover which of the many views to favor. In its most general sense, this is what has come to be known as "the problem of the criterion."
There are two typical responses to relativity arguments. One is to take one of the conflicting "views" of things as revealing its reality. For example, we might want to say that the perception of a stick through the medium of air, where it appears straight, is superior to the view of the stick through the water, where it appears bent. Or when it is in the water, it may be that the perception of touch is to be preferred to that of sight. The second approach is to concede the relativity of perception while proposing that there is some "higher" view of things which presents them as they really are and explains why they appear in the different ways that they do.
Let us consider the first approach. Here is an example in which it seems that a choice is obvious. Suppose I have I had two perceptions of my front lawn. In the present case it is presented as covered with green grass. In another it is presented as made of glass and covered with purple worms. The first occurs in a waking state, and the second in a dream.
Which of the two perceptions am I to take to present the lawn as it really is? "Of course," I might say, "it is the waking state." Or at least, I make this decision from my current wakeful standpoint, which automatically favors my waking perception. The Pyrrhonian argues that I cannot, in my present state, act as an impartial judge, because I have been "contaminated" by the situation I am currently in. "For we assent to things that are in the present and move us in the present, more than to things that are not in the present" (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 113). How many times have we, in our dreaming states, taken the present perceptions to present objects as they really are, all the while puzzling about how the objects seem quite different from what we remember?
Now suppose a choice is made, perhaps a choice to favor the perception I have in my present state of mind. My decision must be made on the basis of a good reason (for Sextus, this is called a "proof"), since if it is not, my choice is "discredited." The good reason must come in the form of a standard or criterion for judging between them. I might say, for example, that perceptions I have when I am awake are to be preferred to dream perceptions. For my reason to be a good one, the criterion I use must be correct (or "true"), or else my choice would not be credible. And indeed it makes sense to ask whether perceptions of a waking person represent reality better than do the perceptions of a dreamer, even if it is a question we would not ask in an ordinary context.
Sextus argues that any attempt to provide a good reason ("proof") for adopting the higher-order standard falls into circularity. Here is what Sextus writes:
And neither is it possible for a proof to be sound without the prior existence of a true criterion, nor for a criterion to be true without the previously confirmed proof. And thus the criterion and the proof fall into the circularity type of aporia [difficulty], in which both are found not to be credible; for each, while it awaits the credibility of the other, is equally incredible with the other.(Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 116-117, Mates translation from The Skeptic Way)As the argument is obscure at best, I will venture a reconstruction. We need the standard to be a correct one, one that allows us to make true judgments. Now how are we to determine that S has in fact been successful? We need some standard to determine success or failure. But the only standard available is S itself, since it is what allows us to determine success or failure in a given case. In that case, the reasoning we use for choosing S as a standard is circular, which discredits the choice.
It might be thought that the argument goes too fast. Why should S have to be the standard for its own correctness? Sextus seems to have assumed that in carrying out any "proof," we use a single standard which we already possess. If we have only one standard, then we do fall into circularity because we would have to use it to prove its own truth. It may be that we posses other standards that allow us to avoid circularity, but it should be noted that often we use a limited standard to justify its own use.
As we saw, in making judgments about which perceptions (or "presentations" or "impressions") represent the world as it truly is, I choose as my basis perceptions from my present waking state over those from which come from dreaming states (call them "waking-perceptions" and "dreaming-perceptions," respectively). I make the choice because I judge that my waking-perceptions are true vastly more often than are my dreaming-perceptions. But on what basis do I make this higher-level judgment?
It appears that the judgment is made on the basis of waking-perceptions. When I try to establish what we now call a "track record" of success for my waking-perceptions, I appeal to waking-perceptions. But the question at issue just is how successful my waking-perceptions are at representing reality, and to appeal to other waking-perceptions begs this question. This problem of establishing a "track record" is still discussed in the epistemological literature.
This problem does not arise only for perception. Consider the case of logic. Suppose I want to show which forms of argument are valid. I do so by reasoning about the structure of their components, perhaps using a device like truth-tables. Why should I think that my higher-level reasoning is valid? It seems that it is only by using the very argument-forms I am trying to show to be valid.
There is yet another case, one which historically is one of the most important applications of the problem of the criterion. A central dispute in the early sevententh century was about the truth of claims made in the Bible. The standard for deciding that those claims are true could be that the writers of the Bible were inspired by God, and that any writings inspired by God are true. Then the question arises as to the application of the standard: how do we prove that the statements in the Bible are divinely inspired? One answer would be that the Bible itself testifies to its own divine inspiration.
It seems that if we do not want to embrace circular justification, we should try to break out of the loop by appealing to a different standard to justify the standard in question. This is the second anti-relativist strategy noted above--a strategy that has been adopted by many more-recent dogmatists.
Take the case of waking- versus dreaming-perceptions. As we will see, Descartes argued that we can appeal to a priori reasoning, reasoning entirely independent of perception, to justify the use of waking-perceptions as a standard. Some would hold that through intuition we can recognize the validity of simple forms of inference. And some would hold that we can establish the authority of the Bible through faith, or perhaps by we can do so by proving independently of the Bible that God exists, and using that fact to justify our use of the Bible as an authority.
The idea is that we are trying to justify the use of some standard S by appealing to another standard S* which does not require an appeal to S for its own justification. Sextus assumes that S* is of no use unless it is "true" and has been "proved." So how are we to "prove" the "truth" of S*? We have seen that we cannot use S* in the proof, so we must appeal to some other standard S**.
Now S** is either S* itself, or S, or it is distinct from both of them. If S** is S*, then there is circularity, as above. If it is S, then there is a relation of "reciprocal" justification between S** and S which is not circular, at least directly. We might say there is a "coherence" or "concurrence" between the two, in that the results of each faculty "supports" the other.
To avoid circularity or recipocal justification, S** must be something distinct from both S* and S. If it is, then the question of its justification is raised once again, and the same choices confront us. So there are only three possibilities: self-validation, which is "narrowly" circular, reciprocal validation, which is more "widely" circular, or no justification at all. An infinite chain of justification is not possible, given that we must use an already-established standard to make good decisions, and as finite beings we are not able to establish a standard through an infinite number of steps.
Sextus tells us that "later Skeptics" proposed a list of five modes leading to suspension of judgment about the way things really are. Diogenes Laertius attributes these modes to one Agrippa, a person about whom we have no other record. They are based on:
The mode of disagreement simply takes into account the vast scope of conflict among opinions about what is real. The problem is not the mere existence of conflict, but rather that all attempts to overcome them have led to impasse. The relativity mode is the generic statement of what had earlier been broken down into ten modes, as discussed above.
The second, fourth, and fifth modes present the options discussed by Aristotle in light of the skeptical regress argument. The second mode assumes that all of our judgments must be backed up by reasons. So for any given judgment J, there must be at least one reason R to think that it is true. But R demands a reason R*, and so on to infinity. The fifth mode raises an option also rejected by Aristotle, that circular reasoning can be used to justify a belief.
The mode of hypothesis is meant to counter the Aristotelian solution to the second mode, i.e., the regress of reasons. Any reason which is not itself backed up by a reason for demonstration is called an "hypothesis." According to this mode, hypotheses cannot provide a sufficient reason for belief just because they lack the backing of reasons for their truth. Someone else may propose a hypothesis supporting an opposing point of view, and that hypothesis will be no less credible than the first.
A final reduction of the number of modes is to two. These modes are the result of a dilemma. If we are to apprehend the way an object really is, we do so either directly or else through the use of some other apprehensions. The fact that there is disagreement over almost every description of reality, whether the object of the senses or the object of thought, shows that apprehension is not direct.
If the apprehension is indirect, then it is subject to the regress argument described in the five modes. The infinite and circular chains of reasons are once again rejected. The Aristotelian solution to the regress would require that the object be apprehended through itself. But this solution has been rejected already in the first mode. It should be noted that the first mode depends on the contingent fact that there is disagreement on all cases. If there were a case of agreement, the objection would be overcome. But even the agreed-upon judgment would still be subject to the mode "from hypothesis" discussed under the five modes.
The Pyrrhonian modes, as well as other arguments made by the skeptics, contain assertions about what is or is not the case. Any relativity argument takes as its starting point an assertion that there are two different conditions of some kind or other. It appears that the Pyrrhonians may have been inconsistent in making their assertions. That is, they may have been violating their own prescription not to assent to anything that is not evident.
One line of defense cited by Pyrrho is to say that the assertions indicate only what appears to be the case to the skeptics (Outlines of Pyrrhonism I, 17). The skeptic is expressing only his feeling about the matter, "without belief, not firmly maintaining anything concerning what exists externally."
A more interesting line described by Pyrrho is that the skeptical conclusion "no more this than that," applies to itself. The skeptical conclusion is no more reasonable than its opposite. Pyrrho apparently did not think that there is any problem with this consequence. The reason seems to be something like this. The skeptical arguments destroy belief, leaving one in a state of suspension. Generalizing the skeptical arguments might destroy belief in the premises and conclusions they contain. But it need not restore the original beliefs. It might only make the skeptic more thoroughly skeptical.
The Pyrrhonians distinguished their own approach to belief from that of the "Academic" skeptics who flourished in Plato's Academy. As we have seen, they criticized the Academics for "dogmatizing" about our lack of an adequate standard for belief.
Academic skepticism arose in the Academy under the leadership of Arcesilaus, who lived mostly in the third century B.C. There were plenty of currents in the philosophy of Socrates and Plato which would push one of their followers toward skepticism. We has seen that Socrates proclaimed his own ignorance. Plato provided deep and difficult criticisms of his own metaphysical theory, and the results of many of his dialogues were inconclusive. The approach of Arcesilaus was to argue both sides of every question, much as Plato (as well as some of the Sophists) had done.
Arcesilaus is best known for his criticisms of the Stoic epistemology, which we discussed in the last module. He argued that the Stoic theory of the "graspable presentation" cannot stand given its own assumptions, and his prescription was that judgment be suspended, and that no positive assertions should be made (aphasia). The Pyrrhonians thought he was a dogmatist because he made the unqualified assertion that assent is bad and suspension of judgment is good. There is a debate in the literature as to whether Arcesilaus's views can be reconciled.
Carneades
Several generations later, Arcesilaus was succeeded by Carneades as head of the Academy. Carneades followed the practice of arguing both sides of every issue, and he likewise opposed the Stoic epistemology. He broadened the attack on dogmatism into the fields of ethics and metaphysics. There is some dispute even in the ancient literature as to whether he held a positive epistemology or no views at all.
The chief difference between Arcesilaus and Carneades seems to have been that the latter recognized the practical impossibility of total suspension of assent. We need some standard whereby to regulate our behavior and to attain happiness. For this reason, Carneadeas set up a weaker standard of the "plausible" (pithane).
A plausible impression is supposed to have three characteristics. It is:
For example, when a rope is lying coiled up in a dark room, a person who enters the room suddenly gets a simply plausible impression that it is a snake; but to a person who has looked carefully around and considered the circumstances--for example, that it does not move, that it is of such and such a color, and so on--it appears to be a rope, in accord with the impression that is plausible and tested. (Outlines of Pyrrhonism I, 228-9, Mates translation)The second condition is required to account for obstacles or impediments (as the Stoics called them) to plausibility. An example given is of Admetus, whose wife Alcestis had died. When she is brought back from the dead by Heracles, Admetus refused assent, tending instead to disbelief. We now would say that there was a "defeater" blocking his assent.
Impressions may be more or less plausible, depending on how convincing they are and how thoroughly they have been tested, and perhaps the strength of potential defeaters. The assent to the impressions, in turn, may be stronger or weaker. For matters of little import, a merely convincing impression will do. For more important matters, it is important that there be no "defeaters" of the impression. And in those matters pertaining to happiness, the impression should be tested thoroughly.
Most importantly, an impression meeting these requirements may be false, unlike the grasping presentation. Note the similarity between these conditions and the Stoic demand that the grasping presentation have "no impediments" and that it be unshakable by argument. The grasping presentation could be seen as the limiting case of being thoroughly tested. Some have argued that Carneades was only trying to reduce the Stoic grasping presentation to fallibility.
In the sixteenth century A.D., there arose a revival of skepticism. The most important writer who embraced skepticism was Michel de Montaigne, but there were others. Some commentators have described the advancing appeal of skepticism as an intellectual crisis. It was fed by the disputes between the Catholics and the Protestants, particularly over standards for true religious belief.
Individual conscience, the Bible, the authority of the Roman Catholic Church all were brought forward as standards by the different parties. Much of the intellectual debate during the Protestant Reformation revolved around the justification of the use of these standards. The efforts of the Frenchman René Descartes to overcome the force of skeptical arguments was one of the chief factors in the formation of modern epistemology.
For a comprehensive analytical account of ancient skepticism, see R.J. Hankinson, The Sceptics. I have used this excellent book as a guide for my discussion.
For a somewhat suspect ancient account of The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius, click here.
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