

Topical Outline
Philosophy 174
Fall, 2015

- I. Science of Man
 - A. The aim is to discover the principles of the operation of the human mind
 - B. The principles are inferred from observations of human behavior and thought-experiments
- II. Perceptions
 - A. All perceptions are impressions or ideas
 - 1. Impressions are more forceful than ideas
 - 2. Impressions include sensations and emotions or passions
 - 3. For the most part, impressions precede ideas, the exception being some passions
 - B. Simple and complex
 - 1. Simple perceptions do not allow of any distinction or separation
 - 2. Complex perceptions may be distinguished and separated
 - 3. Simple ideas are derived from simple impressions
 - 4. Simple ideas are fainter, though exact, copies of simple impressions
 - 5. Complex ideas are mostly copies of impressions but need not be
- III. Types of impressions
 - A. Impressions of sensation, which arise in the soul originally, from unknown causes
 - B. Impressions of reflection, which are subsequent to and derived from those of sensation
 - C. Ideas of memory, which in a sense are “equivalent to” impressions in their force
- IV. The association of ideas
 - A. Ideas are associated by three principles
 - 1. Resemblance
 - 2. Contiguity
 - 3. Cause and Effect
 - B. The principles are a “gentle force” that bring ideas together
- V. Types of Relations
 - A. Ideas are related in one of two ways
 - 1. Naturally, where one or more of the principles of association brings them together
 - 2. Philosophically, where ideas are compared in the absence of the force of a principle
 - B. Philosophical Relations
 - 1. Resemblance (also natural)
 - 2. Identity over time
 - 3. Spatial and temporal relations (also natural)
 - 4. Relations of quantity and number
 - 5. Relations of quality
 - 6. Contrariety (existence vs. non-existence)
 - 7. Cause and effect (also natural)
- VI. Modes and substances
 - A. The idea of substance is only that of a collection of closely related particular qualities
 - B. The idea of mode is that of a collection of qualities not closely related or in different things
- VII.. Abstract ideas
 - A. All general ideas are only particular ones used in a general way (Berkeley)
 - B. The chief reason is that we are not able to separate qualities in a complex idea
 - C. A particular idea becomes when attached to one name associated with it and like ideas

- D. A distinction of reason is made by comparing particular ideas in different respects
- VII. Ideas of space and time
 - A. The imagination cannot attain to an idea of infinite division
 - B. All perceptions terminate in a minimum with no distinguishable parts
 - C. Therefore there can be no demonstration of the infinite divisibility of extension
 - D. As a result, the conclusions drawn in geometry are imprecise
- VIII. Idea of existence
 - A. It is impossible to separate existence from any idea
 - B. So, the idea of existence is the same as the idea of what we think of as existing
 - C. The same holds for the idea of external existence
- IX. Knowledge
 - A. The only knowledge we can have is through the comparison of ideas
 - 1. Intuitive: comes from direct comparison (resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality)
 - 2. Demonstrative: comes from indirect comparison (proportions of quantity or number)
- X. Probability
 - A. All other relations are objects of probable reasoning (identity, time/space, cause/effect)
 - B. Only cause and effect gives reason to believe in the existence of what is not seen or felt
- XI. Cause and effect
 - A. The idea of cause and effect has three components
 - 1. Temporal priority of cause to effect
 - 2. Contiguity of objects in causal relations
 - 3. Necessary connection of objects in causal relations
 - B. It cannot be demonstrated that everything that begins to exist has a cause
 - C. So it must be explained from experience why we make causal inferences
 - D. We begin with a present impression of sense or “impression” of memory
 - E. Experience reveals constant conjunction of one kind of object with another
 - F. Reason cannot discover the basis of the conjunction
- X. Belief
 - A. The result of constant conjunction is belief, which is a lively idea of the effect or cause
 - B. Ideas may be enlivened in many ways, most importantly by custom
- XI. Probability
 - A. There are two kinds of “philosophical” probability: that of chances and that of causes
 - 1. There is no real chance, but only a more or less lively idea
 - 2. Causes are more or less probable depending on their opposition by other causes
 - B. One kind of “unphilosophical” probability is the acceptance of general rules
- XIII. Idea of a necessary connection
 - A. No necessary connection is discoverable either by reason or experience
 - B. The impression that gives rise to the idea of a necessary connection lies in the mind
 - C. It is a felt determination to pass from an impression to an idea, based on custom and habit
- XIV. Cause reconsidered
 - A. A cause can now be said to be an object that gives rise to an idea of an effect out of habit
 - B. Various general rules can be laid down for judging causes and effects
- XV. Skepticism concerning the senses
 - A. We naturally believe that bodies exist distinct from the mind
 - B. But we cannot perceive a body’s continued and hence distinct existence when not perceived
 - C. If the perceptions are the objects (the “vulgar system”), then objects stop existing
 - D. Philosophers try to remedy this problem by claiming that the object exists unperceived

- E. But their “system” only invents new perceptions, which are in fact unperceived
 - F. In fact, the imagination on its own connects our separated perceptions
 - G. We avoid skepticism in this case by “carelessness and inattention”
- XVI. The Ancient System
- A. Ancient philosophers postulated “matter” and “substance” as principles of unity
 - B. But these are just products of the imagination to smooth the transition from idea to idea
- XVII. The Modern System
- A. Modern philosophers distinguish between primary and secondary qualities
 - B. Primary qualities are said to be mind-independent while the secondary depend on the mind
 - C. But in fact, there can be no separation of primary and secondary qualities
- XVIII. Personal Identity
- A. We have no way of comparing past and present perceptions said to make up our “self”
 - B. So the imagination invents a continuing self when all that is present is related perceptions
- XIX. Skepticism
- A. The preceding observations lead one to doubt that there are external objects or a self
 - B. It seems that all our beliefs about them are based on fictions of the imagination
 - C. The cure for this doubt lies in stepping away from complicated reasoning
 - D. But one may continue to use it so long as one does so in a way that is not dogmatic
- XX. The Passions
- A. Passions are impressions that are either pleasurable or painful, calm or violent
 - B. The cause of a passion may be direct or indirect
 1. Direct passions are reactions to objects that is a feeling of pleasure or pain
 2. Indirect passions are reactions to things related to ourselves or others
 - C. The indirect passions of pride and humility concern relations of things to ourselves
 1. The thing causes an impression of pleasure in us, in the case of pride
 2. This pleasure is transferred to a resembling pleasure in ourselves as related to the thing
 - D. Humility is the result of the same process, only with respect to pain
 - E. Love and hatred function the same way, only with the thing related to another person
 - F. Love and hatred are often based on sympathy for the person loved or hated
 1. Sympathy is the reproduction of another’s passions in our own mind
 2. Our idea of another’s pleasure and pain is enhanced by our resemblance to the other
 3. The idea can be enhanced to the extent that it attains the vivacity of an impression
- XXI. Liberty and necessity
- A. Humans have liberty “of spontaneity” insofar as they are not externally constrained
 - B. But they lack liberty “of indifference”
 1. Such indifference is not chance, as there is no such thing as chance
 2. In fact, humans are not indifferent, but very regular, in the choices they make
 - C. Human actions are caused, according to the above account of causality
 1. We are accustomed to humans behaving in regular ways
 2. We infer that they will continue to happen in those ways
- XXI. Moral judgments are not derived from reason
- A. When we make moral judgments, we express our approval or disapproval of what is judged
 - B. The source of our approval is not the conformity of the object of the judgment to reason
 - C. Moral approval or disapproval is the basis of action
 - D. But judgments of reason are only instruments that aid in realizing what we already will to do
 - E. We must be careful not to make normative claims based only on descriptive claims
- XXII. Moral judgments are derived from a moral sense

- A. The only other source of moral judgments is feelings of approval or disapproval
 - B. In this way they are feelings, akin to the pleasure from beauty or pain from disfigurement
- XXIII. Artificial virtues and vices
- A. Some attributions of virtue arise from natural feelings of pleasure or displeasure (generosity)
 - B. Others, particularly justice, are the result of human constructions
 - C. The virtue of justice arises from an agreement to respect rules that promote society
 - D. Without such rules, humans are at a severe disadvantage in coping with nature
 1. Human nature promotes selfishness and clannishness, contrary to the good of society
 2. In a “primitive” state, this results in possessions being insecure, which again is anti-social
 3. Rules of justice promote the stability of possession, which is for the social good
- XXIV. Government
- A. Agreements to respect one another’s property require enforcement to be effective
 - B. To this end are establish governments with impartial rulers, enforcers, and judges
- XXV. Natural virtues and vices
- A. Virtues and vices are attributable to persons, not to actions as such
 - B. Attribution of virtue and vice are made on the basis of love or hatred of the person
 - C. For artificial virtues, we love a just person because of the benefits of justice for society
 - D. We approve of societal benefits only because of the sympathy we have for others
 - E. Attribution of natural virtues have the same basis, as with the case of generosity