Notes on Hume's Treatise

by G. J. Mattey

BOOK I. OF THE UNDERSTANDING

PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

SECTION II. Of scepticism with regard to the senses.

It is in vain to ask, "Whether there be body or not," since we must take that for granted in all our reasoning. We can only ask, "What causes induce us to believe in the existence of bodies."

We begin with a distinction:

• CONTINUED existence when not present to the senses

• existence DISTINCT from the mind and perception

These two imply each other [but beware later argumentation], but by separating them we can better isolate whether it is senses , reason, or the imagination that gives us the opinion.

Part II, Sec. VI shows the absurdity of the notion of external existence "when taken for something specifically different from our perceptions."

The SENSES can give rise to no notion of continued existence: it would be a contradiction in terms. They could only support distinct existence. But they do not do this either: "A single perception can never produce the idea of a double existence, but by some inference either of the reason or imagination."

If our senses presented impressions as external to ourselves, then we ourselves would have to be objects of the senses. But our personal identity is such a tough nut that the senses cannot crack it. Also, our impressions appear as they are [WYSIWYG].

A common-sense argument for realism: our senses represent our body, impressions appear exterior to the body, so we consider them exterior to ourselves.

First, We perceive only our impressions, not our body itself, Second, secondary qualities, Third sight does not inform us of distance without reasoning, "as acknowledged by the most rational philosophers" [Berkeley].

Independency is an opinion derived from experience, and continued existence cannot be derived from the senses.

Confirmation: three kinds of impressions: first, figure, bulk, motion and solidity of bodies, second, colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat, and cold, third, pains and pleasure .

Vulgar: only the third do not have a distinct continued existence.

Philosophers: only the first has distinct continued existence.

Philosophers recognize the colors and sounds "are originally on the same footing with the pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from fire." The second are perceptions arising from configurations and motions of parts of bodies. The vulgar confound perceptions and objects, "and attribute a distinct continu'd existence to the very things they feel or see." It could not be a conclusion formed by the understanding, since it is completely unreasonable. Cause and effect reasoning cannot do the job either. IMAGINATION is the only faculty that could lead us to this conclusion.

All impressions are perishing, so we need to isolate that concurrence of some impressions which leads to the notion of distinct and continuing existence.

Involuntariness and vivacity are not the qualities we seek: pain and pleasures, passions and affections are counterexamples.

Constancy is the distinguishing feature. They "present themselves in the same uniform manner, and change not upon account of any interruption in my seeing or perceiving them."

It admits of exceptions, but even then the preserve a coherence and regular dependence on each other.

Hume gives the example of the porter. I am seated next to the fire, which is remembered. A noise is heard and then a porter is seen advancing.

I must suppose that the door still exists, that the stairs do, etc. Since I do not, as I am accustomed to, hear and see the door opened at the same time, I must suppose it is there and opened without being seen. Although at first "entirely arbitrary and hypothetical," it is the only way the "contradictions" can be resolved.

It is not a garden-variety inference concerning cause and effect, but is indirect and oblique. No degree of regularity in our perceptions is sufficient to infer a greater degree of regularity: this would require a habit acquired from what is not present to the mind. Some other principles are needed.

The supposition of continued existence is the result of a kind of inertia whereby the mind drifts beyond the continuity actually presented.

Coherence, however, is too weak a principle. Constancy is needed.

When there is an interruption, we have a kind of contradiction, since one impression is destroyed and another created, yet we regard them as the same. To get around this we remove the interruption "by supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which we are insensible." The idea of continued existence thus gains vivacity from the memory and propensity to regard the impressions as the same.

Principle of individuation. A single object conveys the idea of unity, not identity, but a multiplicity cannot convey the idea either, since they are distinct. But what lies between unity and number? Several things surveyed at the same instant (number) or an imagined change in the time without any variation or interruption in the object (unity). The principle of individuation is thus invariableness and uninterruptedness through a supposed variation of time.

From resemblance to identity. Only invariableness is present. We speak with the vulgar and call things indifferently object and perception. If two ideas are very much alike, the mind is disposed to react to them in the same way. We suppose any difference to lie in time. But we are easily fooled: the easy transition is very easily mistaken for the case of "one constant and uninterrupted perception.""

Fn. There are two confounded resemblances: between the perceptions and the act of the mind surveying them.

From broken perceptions to continued existence. The mind seeks to release the tension between the notion of identity and the interruption of appearance. We cannot, due to smoothness, give up identity, so we sacrifice interruption. However, the perception clearly goes away: it is a contradiction to suppose it existent without being present to the mind.

(Cf. Section VI. below) But we do suppose it to be "absent from the mind without being annihilated." This is because the mind is a heap of perceptions, any one of which can be broken off without absurdity.

How does an object become present to the mind without the creation of a new perception? It can be present or absent without any change in itself.

The vivacity of the idea of continued existence. The old excitation theory is brought out: "some lively impressions of the memory" give the vivacity to the fiction.

A summary is given.

But now we have to reckon with independent existence, and the preceding reasoning will fail. All kinds of illusions show perceptions to be dependent on us. This disqualifies continued existence of perceptions if perceptions are identified with objects. So they distinguish them. But this is "only a palliative remedy, and ... contains all the difficulties of the vulgar system, with some others, that are peculiar to itself." No principles lead us to the opinion of the double existence of perception and object, other than the vulgar hypothesis of the identity and continuance of interrupted impressions.

The double-existence hypothesis has "no primary recommendation, either to reason or the imagination." With respect to reason, since there are only perceptions present to the mind, these are the only things that are constantly conjoined: "we can never observe it between perceptions and objects." So we have no basis for inference from the existence of the perceptions to the existence of objects.

With respect to imagination, it is difficult to prove a negative. A challenge is issued to show why the imagination would make a move from broken, interrupted, different perceptions, "to the belief of another existence, resembling these perceptions in their nature, but yet continu'd, and uninterrupted, and identical." This is not likely. The matter is difficult and abstract, and we should instead account for the common opinion about the continued existence of bodies on the common hypothesis of the continued existence of perceptions.

The double-existence hypothesis "acquires all its influence on the imagination from the vulgar one" [continued existence of perceptions]. This follows from the lack of primary recommendation from reason and the imagination, for it has "no original authority of its own." There follows an explanation of the link between "these two systems, tho' directly contrary.'

The natural train of reasoning of the imagination is that the interruption in our perceptions is only apparent. But it is not, and the proper conclusion is to give up on the continued existence of bodies. But only "a few extravagant sceptics" (who could maintain it in words) only were able to see the argument through to this conclusion.

When there is a conflict between opinions formed from calm reflection and those "we embrace by a kind of natural instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to mind," there is no question which will win. We must focus on philosophy for the former to win out, but "the moment we relax our thoughts, nature will display herself, and draw us back to the former opinion." This can happen even in the middle of our most profound reflections, thus blocking our conclusions. The opinion of continued existence "has take such deep root in the imagination, that 'tis impossible ever to eradicate it, nor will any strain'd metaphysical conviction of the dependence of our perceptions be sufficient for that purpose."

The struggle goes on, and to set ourselves at ease we advance a new hypothesis, consistent with the interruptedness of our perception and agreeable to the imagination, "attributing a continu'd existence to something else, which we call objects." The result is a "monstrous offspring" of two contrary principles both embraced: imagination telling us that resembling perceptions have a continuing existence and reason that they do not. We attribute "the interruption to perceptions, and the continuance to objects." By feigning this double existence, we give each side "all the conditions it desires."

There would be no need of objects were we fully convinced in the uninterrupted and independent nature of perception, nor would there be any need if we fully embraced their interruption and dependence.

The similarity to the vulgar system has the advantage of allowing people to continue their usual lives without any difference from anyone else.

Other remarks. First, Cause/effect inference does not justify any claims of existence of objects, and even if it did, it would not justify claims of resemblance in general. Since what we perceive is only perceptions, we "must make every thing resemble them."

Secondly, We suppose resemblance in particulars, where a perception is said to be caused by the object. For we suppose resemblance in causes: we "compleat the union" between causality and resemblance, which we have a strong propensity to do (cf. Section V). This completes the examination of systems.

The initial resolve to place an implicit faith in our senses is overcome by a sentiment to place no faith at all in them. "I cannot conceive how such trivial qualities of the fancy, conducted by such false suppositions, can ever lead to any solid and rational system." For the vulgar system, these are: coherence and constancy of perception. The constancy of the senses, though initially most persuasive, is based on the "gross illusion" that resembling perceptions are numerically identical. The philosophical system is based on the introduction of a new kind of perception (what else can they be?), which at once denies and establishes the vulgar system. "What then can we look for from this confusion of groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and falsehood? And how can we justify to ourselves any belief we repose in them?"

We cannot get rid of this sceptical doubt, and only carelessness and inattention can remedy this malady. So for the next two sections, the existence of both the internal and external worlds will be supposed.

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