BOOK II. of the passions.

PART I. of pride and humility

SECTION XI. Of the love of fame

There is also a secondary cause of pride and humility: our reputation. To account for this fact that virtue, beauty and riches have little influence when not praised by others, we need to explain the nature of sympathy.

The propensity to sympathize with others is most remarkable, and found in children and the most mature adults. We can attribute to this the agreement of people from a single nation (cf. people united by soil and climate who cannot form a unified government). The attitudes of others influence us deeply. This must be explained

When a person has a certain attitude, we know it through its effects and the signs given by verbal and non-verbal expression. We get an idea of the attitude, which converts into an impression, "and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection." But although the passage is instantaneous, it can be understood by the philosopher.

We have a lively impression of ourselves, and so a lively conception of our own person. When an object is related to us, this vivacity passes over to the conception of it, though not as strongly as the conception of ourselves.

Resemblance plays a role here. Nature has made people very similar, but when there are further similarities of manners, character, country or language, sympathy is facilitated, because the imagination makes an easy transition.

Contiguity also does its part. We are more influences by the sentiments of people when nearby. Further, causation plays a role in blood relations. Acquaintance does so as well. "All these relations, when united together, convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and make us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner."

Hume now appeals to the continuity between impressions and ideas in their vivacity: "an idea of a sentiment or passion, may by this means be so inliven’d as to become the very sentiment or passion." Our affections, coming from ourselves, arise more naturally from the imagination and every lively idea we form of them. "This is the nature and cause of sympathy; and ‘tis after this manner we enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them."

This supports both the system of the understanding and that of the passions. Causation, resemblance and contiguity all enter into the explanation. And we can see from the production of the passion that an idea may be made very lively by the relation of cause and effect alone.

Now on to the influence of sympathy on pride and humility, when they arise from prais and blame. We praise people for qualities that would produce pride in ourselves. Sympathy and reasoning have a peculiar influence when turned on the judgment of our own worth. "Such judgments are always attended with passion; and nothing tends more to disturb our understanding, and precipitate us into any opinions, however unreasonable, than their connexion with passion; which diffuses itself over the imagination, and gives an additional force to every related idea."

This is theoretically reasonable, but to "bestow a full certainty on this reasoning, we must examine the phænomena of the passions, and see if they agree with it."

We value fame in general, but the more when those who approve of us are those of whom we ourselves approve. The same goes for mortification. Also, we are more pleased with the judgment of a wise man than that of a fool.

Length of acquaintance is also a factor.

We don’t get much pleasure from the praises of others unless they pertain to the virtues in which we chiefly excel.
A soldier gives little value to eloquence, etc.

Men of good families but who are impoverished frequently leave for other parts, so that the poverty will "by that means sit more easily upon us." This provides confirmation for the system.

First, resemblance, contiguity blood relation raise the sympathy which results in the uneasiness of our being condemned. So we separate ourselves from our relations.

Second, the importance of relations is that they influence our conversion of our ideas of them into ideas of ourselves.

Third, the contempt of the strangers and of the relatives, though both operative, can be separated.

Fourth, a person who has fallen from a better life compares himself now to himself then. But he does not have to receive the comparison by a sympathy with others, which makes him feel better.

Any objections to Hume’s claim, "that the pleasure, which we receive from praise, arises from a communication of sentiments," actually confirm it. A man who despises the vulgar nonetheless finds fame among them agreeable, because their multitude increases their authorities. A plagiarist is delighted with undeserved praises, as they reinforce his delusions ("a kind of castle-building, where the imagination amuses itself with its own fictions, and strives to render them firm and stable by a sympathy with the sentiments of others." If you condemn the love of a lover, the opposition can only take hold if there is sympathy with you.