Context

Sections 4 through 6 described how we reason causally from a present impression of an object to an idea of an object not present. At the conclusion of Section 6, the author stated that an idea’s being related to or associated with a present impression is part of what constitutes belief. In Section 7, the author completed his account of the nature of belief by adding the requirement that the related idea be lively, or to have force and vivacity. In the present section, the author inquires into what it is that gives liveliness to ideas related to a present perception.

Background

The present Section is an elaboration of the account of belief given in the previous two Sections, which is unique to the author.

The Treatise

1. The author has established the nature of belief: a lively idea related to a present perception. He will now show the principles from which belief is derived and the manner in which the liveliness of the present perception is conveyed to the related idea.

2. The general explanatory principle, which the author woul’d willingly establish . . . as a general maxim in the science of human nature, is that “when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity.” He defends the principle in the following way. First, he takes it for granted that the operations of the mind depend in great measure on the mind’s disposition at the time when they take place. Two factors affecting this disposition are the degree of elevation of the animal spirits [what we might now call the excitement of the nervous system] and the degree to which the mind is attentive to its object. Now suppose that the mind attends to an object, which attention enlivens the disposition of the mind. Then the actions of the mind will be accordingly more strong and vivid so long as the disposition lasts. Since it was the attention to the object that was responsible for the enlivening of the mind, attention to another object will change the disposition. On the other hand, if the mind continues to fix its attention on the object or on an object to which the attention slides very easily, the original disposition will last much longer. This mechanism is applied to the present case. The attention of the mind is fixed on an impression, which by its very nature is lively. It then makes an easy transition to a related idea, which tends to preserve the disposition, which, in turn, enlivens the idea. The change of objects is so easy, that the mind is scarce sensible of it, but applies itself to the conception of the related idea with all the force and vivacity it acquir’d from the present impression.

3. It would be well if a general description of the nature of the relation between impression and idea, and of the ease of transition from the one to the other, would satisfy us as to the existence of the phenomena described by the principle given at the beginning of the last paragraph. But the author places his chief confidence in an appeal to experience, to prove so material a principle. He therefore undertakes a series of experiments to make his point. The first is the effect of our seeing the picture of an absent friend, which enlivens not only the idea of the friend, but also our feelings for him. This is attributed to two essential factors. The first is the relation of resemblance between the impression conveyed by the picture and the idea we have of the friend. If the picture looked nothing like the friend, neither the idea of nor the passion for him would be affected. The second is the presence of the picture. If we had only an idea of the picture, the transition from it to that of the friend would in fact weaken the force of the idea of the friend. We take a pleasure in viewing the picture of a friend, when ’tis set before us; but when ’tis remov’d, rather choose to consider him directly, than by reflection in an image, which is equally distant and obscure.

4. A second class of experiments of this kind concerns the ceremonies of the Roman Catholic Church. The author describes these ceremonies as mummeries, or showy but empty performances, and he regards the Church itself as a strange superstition. Criticisms of the ceremonies are answered by some Catholics by appeal to the enlivening effects of those external motions, and postures, and actions. This is counted as a good thing because it is difficult to maintain a lively conception if we fix entirely on distant and immaterial objects. Sensible objects do a better job than do a merely intellectual view and contemplation. The author’s only response to these practices and their defense is that it shows how common the livening effect of resemblance is, and as in every case a resemblance, and a present impression must concur, we are abundantly supply’d with experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle [that a present impression conveys its liveliness to a related idea].

5. A different kind of experiment adding force to the principle concerns the relation of contiguity. Consider the case of the idea of an object which is not present to us. The thought of what is near to it will bring that idea to mind. When I am two miles from home, I have a more lively idea of it than when I am two hundred miles away. The ease of transition from the present impression to the idea is the same in both cases. What is different is that the present impression of a nearby object makes the idea more vivid than the present impressions of distant objects.

The author in the Appendix produces a quotation from Cicero’s de Finibus, Book 5, attributed by Cicero to Marcus Piso. Piso cites two examples of the powers of suggestion of place, where being in a place almost brings to life the people who had frequented it.

6. There can be no doubt that the third principle of association, causation, has the same effect as resemblance and contiguity. The author revives the example of superstitious people, whose devotion is enlivened not only by resemblance of statues, but also by relicts of objects related to those whose saintly lives they would imitate. The best instance of such an object would be something created by the saint himself. But objects such as his clothing or furniture still have some effect, as being connected to him by a shorter causal chain than other present things which attest to his existence. This phænomenon clearly proves, that a present impression with a relation of causation may enliven any idea, and consequently produce belief or assent, according to the precedent definition of it.

7. The author now claims that the case of causation is sufficient in itself to establish his general principle. His argument is based on the following premises, which he regards as being certain.

• If we believe in a matter of fact, we must have an idea of it.
• This idea of a matter of fact arises only from a relation to a present impression.
• The belief is only an enlivening of the idea, to which nothing is super-added.

8. Another way of approaching the confirmation of the general principle is to consider it as a question in natural philosophy, which we must determine by observation and experiment. The phenomenon to be explained is this: an object A is present to me, and I form an idea amounting to a belief of the existence another object B, which is related to A but is not present. It may be that there are particular powers and qualities which relate A to B, but they cannot be part of the explanation. The belief of the existence of B is merely internal and the powers and qualities of A and B are external. As such, they are taken by the author to be entirely unknown, [and so] can have no hand in producing the belief. Thus, the real and true cause of the belief must be the present impression of the object. So we need to discover by experiments how the present impression can bring about the belief.

9. The first observation to be made is that the present impression is not capable of producing the belief in and of itself, as a single perception, limited to the present moment. Our first impressions of anything never lead to beliefs about something else. It is only when we have experienced the consequences of the present object that we draw conclusions from its present. This is confirm’d by such a multitude of experiments, that it admits not of the smallest doubt.

10. The second observation is that the belief arises immediately, without any intervention by reason or imagination. The author can be certain of this because he never discovers such operations in himself, nor can he find anything in the subject of the operation [the present impression] that could serve as the basis for an operation by reason or imagination. We may now tie the first two observations together. The impression causes the belief only through repetition and not through reason. This relation is precisely what we call custom. So, we may establish it as a certain truth, that all the belief, which follows upon any present impression, is deriv’d solely from that origin. When we are accustom’d to see two impressions conjoin’d together, the appearance or idea of the one immediately carries us to the idea of the other.

11. Given that custom is a necessary condition for the production of belief it can still be asked whether it is sufficient, that is, whether anything more is needed. To see that something more is needed, make the starting-point an idea rather than an impression. While custom will bring us to make the transition from the idea of A to the idea of B, it will not produce a belief in the existence of B. What is needed is a present impression. The author goes on to note that the only difference between an impression and an idea is the superior liveliness of the former as compared to the latter. From this he draws the conclusion that upon the whole, belief is a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, proceeding from its relation to a present impression [the account given in Section 7 and recounted in the first paragraph of the present Section]. [The argument may be that because a present impression is the cause of the belief, and because the impression makes the idea involved in the belief more like itself (livelier), it is the resultant liveliness that constitutes an idea’s being a belief.]

12. From this the author draws the striking conclusion that all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. In philosophy, as well as in music and poetry, we must follow our taste and sentiment. Conviction of the truth of any principle is nothing more than a strong conception of it. My judgment that one argument is superior to another is no more than the former having a stronger influence over me than the latter. Objects have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference of one to the existence of another. [The unsettling effects of this discovery upon the author are described in Part IV, Section 7.]

13. If probable reasoning is no more than a species of sensation, then deliberation is not involved in it. The operation of the mind may be so hidden from us that we take no notice of it at all, or may even be unable to know its source. The author cites an example of someone who encounters a river [with no bridge or ford] upon his journey. He stops short of walking into the river because he foresees the disastrous consequences of so doing. He does not do so as a result of reflection on the chain of causes: submersion, suffocation, death. Rather, the mind makes its transition from one link to another without recourse to memory. The objects seem so inseparable, that we interpose not a moment’s delay in passing from the one to the other. The passage itself is due to experience, and not to any primary [or a priori] connection between the ideas. So we may conclude that experience may produce a belief and a judgment of causes and effects by a secret operation, and without being once thought of. This conclusion supports the claim of the author [in Section 6] that we do not adopt by reasoning the principle that instances of which we have no experience, must necessarily resemble those, of which we have. One might try to argue that the principle must be based on reason, because only reason can connect the ideas of past and future objects. The author has shown that reason is not, in fact, necessary, which removes this pretext, if there yet remains any. For we here find, that the understanding or imagination can draw inferences from past experience, without reflecting on it; much more without forming any principle concerning it, or reasoning upon that principle.

14. Our most common causal beliefs, such as those about the effects of gravity, solidity, impulse, &c., come about as the result of custom, without reflection on past experience. However, other beliefs, involving rare and unusual associations of objects, do involve such reflection. In some cases, beliefs are apparently formed by reflection without the benefit of custom at all. However, the author will argue that custom is actually produced by reflection, in an oblique and artificial manner. The cases in question involve causal inferences that are made on the basis of the observation of a single succession of objects. We see an A followed by a B, and we believe that the next A will be followed by a B, provided that the experiment is made judiciously and all foreign and superfluous circumstances are carefully removed. Since a habit cannot be developed from a single case, it seems that there is no habit or custom involved in the inference. But, the author insists, such inferences depend on the principle that objects, plac’d in like circumstances, will aways produce like effects. This principle is required for us to make an inference from a single case, and it is based on custom to the extent that there are many millions of experiences that support it. [A]s this principle has establish’d itself by a sufficient custom, it bestows an evidence and firmness on any opinion, to which it can be apply’d. [The reflection produces the custom obliquely and artificially in the sense that it calls up or invokes the custom, so to speak.] In all cases we transfer our experience to instances, of which we have no experience, either expressly or tacitly, either directly or indirectly.

15. This concludes the main discussion of the causes of belief, but there remains an objection that must be answered. The author first notes that ordinary language is not well suited to the description of the operations of the mind. He himself has struggled with the ambiguities of language, and no doubt the reader will as well. The ambiguity in question concerns the expression strong and lively, as it appears in the general principle, that an opinion or belief is nothing but a strong and lively idea deriv’d from a present impression related to it. [In the discussion thus far, the notion of strength and liveliness applies to the view of the object, which is, so to speak, painted in brighter colors, etc.] An objection may be formulated as follows. One of the fundamental principles of the science of the human mind is that all our ideas are deriv’d from correspondent impressions. Now suppose I have an idea and have forgotten the original impression from which it was derived. Appealing to the author’s principle, I may form a belief that I had the original impression. Since it is a belief, the idea is strong and lively, but its source is an idea, not a present impression. And if this strength and liveliness is not derived from a present impression, there seems to be no source of those qualities. The author replies that there is, in fact, a source: the initial idea present to the mind. The existence of the idea as a perception in the mind gives the contemplation of it a kind of strength and liveliness that is independent of its representative function. For as this idea is not here consider’d, as the representation of any absent object, but as a real perception in the mind, of which we are intimately conscious, it must be able to bestow on whatever is related to it the same quality, call it firmness, or solidity, or force, or vivacity, with which the mind reflects upon it, and is assur’d of its present existence. [Thus terms such as ‘vivacity’ describe different kinds of phenomena, which is a kind of ambiguity in their use.] So, the idea can serve as the source of the strength and force that is transferred to the belief of the existence of the impression, though it is a different kind of strength and force from that found in the representation of an object through an impression. The idea here supplies the place of an impression, and is entirely the same, so far as regards our present purpose.

16. The same distinction used to counter the objection may be used to help explain the difference between the ideas of memory and those of the imagination. [In Part I, Section 3 and Part III, Section 4, the author had maintained that one difference is the superior vivacity of the ideas of memory to those of the imagination.] A memory of an idea is an idea of an idea. Given that an idea of memory is stronger than that of mere imagination, an account must be given of its strength. Again, it is not the vivacity of the representation of the object, but the vivacity of the idea as an action of the mind, that accounts for the difference. When we have the original idea that is later remembered, there in the representation of the object is an action of the mind, which has “certain je-ne-sçai-quoi , of which ’tis impossible to give any definition or description, but which every one sufficiently understands.” This action, by virtue of this quality, has a vivacity of sorts greater than that of an action of merely imagining. The idea of the past action of the mind can then take on a vivacity that is greater than that of an act of fancy.

17. After this any one will understand how we may form the idea of an impression and of an idea, and how we may believe the existence of an impression and of an idea.

The Enquiry

The causes of belief are discussed extensively in Part II of Section V of the Enquiry. After having given his account of belief as a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, which arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses, Hume discusses its origins in detail. He begins by recounting the three principles of association that connect ideas in the mind: resemblance, contiguity, and causation. The question he poses is whether each of these modes of association not only connects one idea to another, but also makes that idea steadier and stronger than if it had not been so associated. He has already made the case that this occurs when the principle is that of cause and effect, and if he can show that it holds for the cases of resemblance and contiguity, he may establish as a general law, which takes place in all the operations of the mind, that the association enlivens the associated idea. This program replaces that announced in paragraph 2 and the first two sentences of paragraph 3 of the present Section. The Enquiry then proceeds by taking over verbatim the remainder of paragraph 3 to the penultimate sentence of paragraph 6. At this point, the discussion takes a different turn from that in the Treatise. An example is given of meeting the son of a friend one has not seen in a long time. The idea of that friend would be more vivid than it would be under other circumstances. Hume then notes that this enlivening requires a belief in the existence of the object represented by the associated idea. He then notes that an analogous operation is in play in the production of any belief about what lies beyond the senses and memory. Custom and experience play the same enlivening role as the principles of association. If I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, I expect it to burn, for example. Hume asserts that the succession of ideas arising with custom are in a kind of pre-established harmony with the course of nature, and that this alone is what enables us to adjust means to ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil. Otherwise, we would be restricted to the perceptions of sense and memory. He adds that the ability to form beliefs in this way would not be adequate if they were the product of reason, which is often fallacious, is always slow, and which develops late in life. So it is best confined by nature to instinct.

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