Context

Since Section 7, the author has been cataloging various causes of pride and humility. In the previous Section, the author had discussed certain causes of pride and humility that lie outside the mind and body of the person whose self is the object of those passions. These include such things as qualities of one’s country and ancestors. In the present Section, the author turns to what is more directly related to the object of the passions, namely his property and riches.

Background

Hutcheson was primarily concerned with the desire for property and the pain caused by the frustration of this desire. He did not consider property as a source of pride. A comment at the end of Section V of the Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections illustrates his point of view.

The Desires of Trifles are often made very strong and uneasy; the Pleasures of Possession very small and of short Continuance, only till the Object be familiar, or the Fancy change: but the Pains of Disappointment are often very lasting and violent. Would we guard against these Associations, every real Pleasure of Life remains, and we may be easy without those things, which to others occasion the greatest Pains.

The Treatise

1. The relation of property is considered to be the closest to pride and that which produces it most commonly of any of its causes. The relation of property [between an object and a person] cannot be explained fully apart from the author’s later treatment of justice and moral virtue [in Book III, Part II]. It is sufficient for present purposes that the following definition be used. Property is “such a relation betwixt a person and an object as permits him, but forbids any other, the free use and possession of it, without violating the laws of justice and moral equity.” [There are two accounts of the nature of justice. The first is that] justice is a virtue, which has a natural and original influence on the human mind. [The author will attempt to refute this account in Book III, Part II, Section 1.] Whether we think of the free use of the property in terms of doing to it what we wish or of reaping the benefits of our action upon it, we can think of property as a kind of causation. [The alteration of our property is an effect, with ourselves as the cause. The use of the altered property is also a causal relation between it and ourselves.] The second account of justice is that it is an artificial virtue. [This view will be defended by the author in Book III, Part II, Section 1.] Here, the influence on the mind of justice is the result of honour, and custom, and civil laws, and they have the same effect on the mind as if it were influenced by natural conscience. [That is, we would regard the liberty with respect to our property in causal terms.] Whatever the relation of property turns out to be, it is certain that there is a relation of ideas involved, in that the idea of the property gives rise to the idea of its owner, and vice-versa. This proves that there is a perfect relation between the two ideas, which is sufficient to satisfy the condition for the production of an indirect passion. If the system of the author is solid and satisfactory, then [a] relation of ideas, join’d to that of impressions, always produces a transition of affections; and therefore, whenever any pleasure or pain arises from an object, connected with us by property, we may be certain, that either pride or humility must arise from this conjunction of relations. But even if the system is not correct, experience will show that in fact these pleasures and pains do result in pride and humility.

2. The author notes that a proud or vain person believes that everything he has is the best, whether it be his wine, his food, his horses, his art, or those of his possessions that once belonged to a great person. “All objects, in a word, that are useful, beautiful or surprizing, or are related to such, may, by means of property, give rise to this passion [pride].” What all these objects have in common—and the only thing they have in common—is that they produce pleasure in their owner. Since they have a common effect, pleasure must be their common cause. Each new instance of the production of pride is a new argument for the author’s system, and the instances are here without number. The author surmises that scarcely any other theory has been so fully confirmed by experience.

3. It has been argued that the qualities of utility, beauty, and novelty in one’s property are pleasurable and give rise to the pleasurable passion of pride because of their relation to the owner. If this is right, then it is easy to see that the power to acquire property will have the same effect. The power to acquire the property one please to have is called riches. If riches did not enable one to acquire this property, they would not produce the passion of pride. Pieces of paper are often considered to be riches because they enable one to obtain money, and money is riches only insofar as it enables one to pursue one’s pleasures, and not because of the physical features of the metal of which it is made. If we accept this conclusion, which is so evident, we may draw from it one of the strongest arguments I have yet employ’d to prove the influence of the double relations on pride and humility. [This argument will be developed in the next six paragraphs, culminating in a summary at paragraph 10.]

4. The author has claimed, according to the philosophical way of thinking, that there is no real distinction between the possession of a power and its exercise. Thus, neither man nor any other being ought ever to be thought possest of any ability, unless it be exerted and put into action. [This claim is found in Book I, Part III, Section 14, paragraph 34. It is laid down as a corollary of the general thesis that the idea of power is drawn entirely from the observation of constant conjunction of objects of one kind with those of another, along with a determination of the mind to pass from the impression of an object of one of the kinds to the idea of an object of the other.] On the other hand, the philosophy of our passions depends on the philosophically frivolous idea that we have power that has not been exercised. When we have acquired what we think to be the power of producing pleasure, we are pleased, and when someone else acquires the apparent power of producing pain, we are displeased. This fact is evident from experience, but it will be explained in what follows.

5. One way of understanding the alleged distinction between power and its exercise is that of the scholastic philosophers. According to them, we have free will in such a way that we can have an unexercised power even when we have every motive to exercise it. [No matter how much we desire to do something, we can refrain from so doing, thus retaining the power to do it without exercising that power.] But the author contends that this doctrine has very little influence on ordinary thinking. According to this view, when one has very strong motives not to do something, one lacks the power to do it, but is determined not to. An example is that of an armed enemy of mine whom I encounter in the street. I do not think of myself as in his power when I know that his fear of arrest if he assaults me prevents him from that action. I know that the fear of the civil magistrate is as strong a restraint as any of iron, and that I am in as perfect safety as if he were chain’d or imprision’d. [See Part III, Section 1, paragraph 17 for a similar comparison of internal and physical restraints.] On the other hand, if there are no external restraints, so that I may be rewarded or punished by another person as he pleases, then I consider him to have full power over me and regard myself as his subject and vassal.

6. We may now ask what is the difference between the two cases, such that we attribute impotence to one and power to the other. The only known difference is to be found in the fact that from past experience, we conclude that the weapon will never be used when punishment is feared, whereas from the same experience we conclude that someone unrestrained will possibly or probably act toward me as he wishes. That this is the only difference is a consequence of the reasoning in Book I, Part III, where it is argued that past experience is the only basis for causal reasoning. See in particular Section 6.] Because the willful actions of people are the most fluctuating and inconstant on many occasions, we rely entirely on our beliefs about their strong motives to be able to predict their behavior. If we have no idea of the motives of another, even if we surmise that they have motives, we are uncertain as to what they will do, and this uncertainty can affect our passions. So, we attribute power to those whose motives are uncertain and deny power of those whose motives are known. The former may exercise their will and the latter will not, and so ordinary thinking closely connects power and its exercise, whether it is actual or probable. And we think of people as having power when past experience shows that he may or probably will exercise it. The author continues by asserting that our passions always regard the real existence of objects. [That is, our passions are based on our impressions, pleasurable or disagreeable of objects.] Our beliefs about the real existence of objects are based on past experience. From this, the author concludes that nothing can be more likely of itself, without any farther reasoning, that the power we attribute to others consists in the possibility or probability of any action, as discover’d by experience and the practice of the world. [For example, I might fear someone because he has power over me, and my belief of his power is based on my experience of his ability to do what he wishes without internal or external constraints.

7. When I am in a position in which someone lacks a very powerful motive not to injure me, and as a result, I am uncertain whether he will, I will be uneasy and must be sensibly concerned about the possibility that he will. Thus, mere probabilities and possibilities can influence the passions as well as certainties. And even though, philosophically speaking, if the person does not harm me, I recognize that he did not have the power to harm me, this does not prevent my being uneasy before I found out that I was safe. There is an effect corresponding to the disagreeable uneasiness in this instance of uncertainty. We may take pleasure in contemplating the probability or possibility of a good, based on the probability or possibility of someone’s bringing it about for me if strong motives preventing this are removed.

8. Further, there is an even greater satisfaction when we see ourselves as able to provide a good for ourselves, without either physical impediments or strong motives not to do what is needed. As all men desire pleasure, nothing can be more probable, than its existence when there is no external obstacle to the producing it, and men perceive no danger in following their inclination. When this happy circumstance arises, one’s imagination anticipates easily the satisfaction it expects and feels the same joy as one would feel if he believed that the good really exists.

9. This account of the satisfaction attending the possession of riches is not quite complete, however. There are people, misers, who have never used their riches to gain the goods they desire, yet get pleasure from them because of the their power to gain them. They cannot conclude from experience that they are any nearer to obtaining what they want when they have the means than if they were destitute. But this inability to believe rationally that riches afford them the means to satisfy their desires does not prevent them from imagining that they do, when there are no external obstacles or opposing motives of interest and danger. The author will not explain at this point how this imagining is possible, but he will do so in Part III, Section 2, paragraph 2, where he discusses the nature of the will. There, he will describe how our imagined ability to perform any thing, that is not very dangerous or destructive, is based on a false sensation of liberty. [The explanation is that we think that we could have done something that we did not do, when we actually do it when given a second chance. But this does not prove that we could have done it in the first place, and the motive for doing it on the second occasion is to show that we are free. So there is no liberty, in the sense of lack of motive, in this case, either.] Compare our own situation with that of another person. We judge from experience that when someone has no strong motive to avoid a pleasure, that the pleasure will exist, and that he will probably attain it. Then, when we find ourselves in that position, we think that the probability is even stronger, and the pleasure is still closer and immediate. But this is not based on experience, but rather stems from an illusion of the fancy. The illusion is based on the feeling that our will is loose and can move in any direction. As a result, we create an image not only of ourself as having performed the action, but also as having done something else. Now suppose that we imagine ourselves as in the future performing an action. That image will give us the same lively satisfaction, as if it were perfectly certain and unavoidable. [Thus, the miser can get satisfaction from the image he has of using his riches to procure some good, even if he has no rational foundation for a belief that he will so use them, or even that there is some slight probability that he will.]

10. The points made in the preceding five paragraphs are now drawn together to show that the evident fact that the possession of riches produces pride explains, and can only be explained, by the author’s hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas. It is of the essence of riches that they be the power of procuring the pleasures and conveniences of life. The essence of this power, in turn, lies in the probability of its exercise, and in its causing us to anticipate, by a true or false reasoning, the real existence of the pleasure. The anticipation of a pleasure is itself a pleasure. So, the object [the riches that are related by ownership to ourselves] produces [indirectly] pleasure, and by virtue of the relation of the idea of the riches to that of ourselves, this pleasure produces the pleasurable impression of pride. Thus, we here clearly see all the parts of the foregoing system most exactly and distinctly drawn out before us.

11. The account just given of the production of pride by the possession of riches and humility by poverty explains why possession of power over others leads to pride and slavery to others leads to humility. Authority over others allows us to satisfy all our desires. On the other side, we are subject to a thousand wants, and mortifications when our will is subjected to that of others.

12. The pride of power and humility of slavery are augmented by the status of the persons over whom we have authority or who have authority over us. A thought-experiment to illustrate this is one in which I have authority over an animated statue that would carry out my will perfectly. The pride I would feel is less than if the one carrying out my orders were a sensible and rational being, in which case my authority would seem more agreeable and honourable. Our esteem for any being is increased by comparison. For example, a rich person enjoys his condition more when it is compared with that of a beggar. The case of the exercise of power over another by its very nature makes the comparison between the powerful and the subordinate more obvious and natural. The relation itself lends itself to the comparison, which makes for an easy for us to move from the thought of the relation to that of the comparison. This makes the comparison more influential, as will be seen in Part II, Section 8, when the nature of the passions of malice and envy is examined.

Dissertation II: Of the Passions

The treatment of property and riches as the cause of pride occurs in Section II, item 9. The item and its footnote cover the material in the first three paragraphs of the present Section. It differs from the first paragraph in that it lacks an explicit definition of property, nor does it explain the production of property according to the system of a double relation of ideas and impressions. It also gives a more generic argument for property’s being a species of causation, in that it does not take into account the two opposing views of the nature of justice, but only considers the right of the proprietor to do as he wishes with his property. The second paragraph of this Section is reproduced almost verbatim, with the difference that the concluding clause makes the more modest claim that the examples are sufficient evidence for the theory. A short paragraph on riches replaces the more lengthy account in paragraph 3 of the present Section. It simply cites the fact that riches give the power to acquire objects which are the cause of pride. It does not discuss the double-relations theory or the sense in which the money is related to riches.

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