Notes on Hume’s Treatise

by G. J. Mattey

Book 2
Of the PASSIONS
PART 1
Of pride and humility.

Sect. 12. Of the pride and humility of animals.

Context

The author has concluded his account of the nature and causes of the indirect passions of pride and humility in human beings. In the present Section, he seeks to confirm his account by applying it to non-human animals. This Section parallels the concluding Section of Part III of Book I, in which it is argued that the mechanism that produces beliefs in animals is the same as that which produces beliefs in humans.

Background

This topic is unique to the system of the author.

The Treatise

1. It has been proved in the foregoing that the causes of pride and humility cannot excite the passions unless they are related to the self and produce pleasures or pains distinct from the passions themselves. This is all that the causes of these passions have in common, “and consequently is the quality, by which they operate.” Moreover, “the most considerable causes of these passions are really nothing but the power of producing either agreeable or uneasy sensations; and therefore that all their effects, and amongst the rest pride and humility, are deriv’d solely from that origin.” The author can find no viable objections to this view, and because it is so simple, natural, and solidly proved, it “cannot fail to be receiv’d [i.e., accepted] by philosophers.”

2. In anatomy, hypotheses about human beings are tested by experiments and observations on both humans and animals. The agreement of the results obtained from both kinds of subjects is then taken to be a strong argument in favor of the hypothesis. The author takes it to be certain that where there is both a structural and an operational sameness between ourselves and other animals, the causes of the operations must be the same, and “whatever we discover to be true of the one species, may be concluded without hesitation to be certain of the other.” We may reasonably assume that the mixture of bodily fluids and the composition of the very small parts may be different in humans and other animals, and so we cannot be confident that the effects of medicine on test animals will be the same on humans. On the other hand, there are many structural similarities between the two, including veins and muscles, the heart, lungs, stomach, and liver. So we should make the same hypotheses about such matters as the motion of muscles and the circulation of the blood. If experiments in one species of animals confirms the hypothesis, this should be taken to apply to all species which resemble them in the relevant ways. The author now proposes to apply this method of inquiry, which is found so just and useful in reasonings concerning the body, to our present anatomy of the mind, and see what discoveries we can make by it.

3. The plan is first to show the correspondence between the passions of humans and other animals, and second to compare the causes, which produce these passions.

4. We find evident marks of the passions of pride and humility in nearly all species of creatures, but especially in what the author terms the nobler kinds. The way certain birds such as swans, turkeys and peacocks comport themselves shows that they have high ideas of themselves and contempt for everything else. Further confirmation of the author’s thesis is that this behavior is found only in the male birds, who are the beautiful ones. People frequently remark on the proud behavior of the nightingale in their song, the horse in their swift running, the dog in his sagacity and sense of smell, of every other animal in his particular excellency. Further, all species that comport with humans take pride in the approval that we give them, independently of any other factor. The love shown by people they themselves know and love is more conducive to their pride than that shown by others. This behavior is the same as that in humans. All these are evident proofs, that pride and humility are not merely human passions, but extend themselves over the whole animal creation.

5. As for the causes of these passions, while we must make adjustments in our assessments due to the limited knowledge and understanding of animals, they are otherwise the same. In particular, the animals know little of virtue and vice, easily lose track of blood relations, and cannot enter into relations of rights and property. This rules out two of the three kinds of causes of pride and humility in humans: the mind and external objects. There remains only the body. But in this respect the causes are the same, and ’tis on beauty, strength, swiftness or some other useful or agreeable quality that this passion is always founded.

6. Given that the passions and their causes are the same in humans and non-human animals, the only remaining question is whether the causes produce the passions in the same way. The author asserts that [a]ccording to all the rules of analogy, this is justly to be expected. [Analogical reasoning is discussed in the last paragraph of Book I, Part III, Section 13. All probable reasoning is based on constant conjunction of two objects in all past experience and the resemblance of the present object with those objects. When the resemblance is less than perfect, the probability decreases accordingly. The author does not articulate any further rules governing analogical reasoning. Apparently the rule is that because of the great resemblance between the cause and the effect in both humans and animals, it is highly probable that the manner of causation is resembling in both cases.] On the other hand, if it is found that the way of explaining the manner of causation in the two cases is different, then no matter how convincing is the reasoning to the conclusion that it is the same, the explanation is in reality without foundation.

7. [In order to show that the manner of production of the passion is the same, it is necessary to show both that in animals there is a relation of ideas and that there is a parallel relation of impressions that the relation of ideas assists.] The author first asserts that there is evidently the same relation of ideas, and deriv’d from the same causes, in the minds of animals and those of men. An example is that of a dog who has forgotten where he buried his bone. Upon being brought to the place, the relation of contiguity makes his thought pass easily from the idea of this place to that of the bone buried there. A second example is that of the reaction of a dog who has been heavily beaten in one place. Upon re-visiting it, he trembles, even though he finds no signs of danger there. It is evident that the relation of causation associates ideas in animals, and insofar as resemblance is a component of that relation, we may conclude that resemblance plays a role in animals’ association of ideas, even if there are few clear cases of this happening. So, we may conclude that the three relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation operate in the same manner upon beasts as upon human creatures.

8. The second thing to be shown is that there is a relation of impressions in animals like that in humans [where one impression leads to another, as in the chain from grief and disappointment to anger, then envy, then malice, and back to grief (Section 4, paragraph 3)]. An example of connected emotions [which are impressions] in a dog is the transition from an emotion of joy to one of love and kindness, either toward its master or toward a prospective mate. On the other side, a dog full of pain and sorrow (grief) easily becomes angered and thereby troublesome.

9. The author has now shown that all the internal principles, that are necessary in us to produce either pride or humility, are common to all creatures. The causes are likewise the same for all, and the proper conclusion is that the causes operate in the same way in all creatures. The hypothesis of the author is so simple, and supposes so little reflection and judgment, that ’tis applicable to every sensible creature. This the author takes to be not only a convincing proof of the truth of his hypothesis, but also an objection to every other system that would explain the behavior of animals.

Summary: all the internal principles (of association) are the same in the two cases, as are the causes. So “we may justly conclude, that these causes operate after the same manner thro’ the whole animal creation.” The simplicity of Hume’s “hypothesis” makes it so universally applicable, “which must not only be allow’d to be a convincing proof of its veracity,” but is the basis for rejecting all rival systems.

Dissertation II: Of the Passions

The topic of the pride and humility of animals is not raised in Of the Passions.

[ Previous Section | Next Section | Treatise Contents | Text of the Treatise ]