Context

The topic of Part I is the explanation of the indirect passions of pride and humility. In the previous section, the author had distinguished between the object of these passions (the self), the subject of the cause of these passions (for example one’s house) and the quality of the cause (the beauty of the house). In the present section, the connection between these components will be established.

Background

The author’s account at this point is original.

The Treatise

1. The author’s task at this point is to determine how the object, the subject of the cause, and the quality that inheres in the cause give rise to the two passions. “By this means we shall fully understand the origin of pride and humility.”

2. The passions of pride and humility are “determin’d” to have the self as their object. What determines the self as object of the passions is both a “natural” property and an “original” property. The fact that it is a natural property can be seen from the “steadiness and constancy” of the operation of that property, which always makes the self the object. And even when the passion refers to someone or something beyond ourselves, that person or thing is viewed in its relation to the self.

3. The property that determines the self as the object of these passions is original or is a “primary impulse,” as well as being natural. The first consideration is that the reference to the self is what distinguishes these passions from the others. Further, the author asserts that the soul must have some original properties. He states that original properties are required for there to be secondary properties. He seems to try to explain this by stating, “because in that case, it [the mind] woul’d have no foundation for action, nor cou’d ever begin to exert itself.” [This seems to be the claim that the mind would be inactive if it did not possess original properties.] Properties which are original, in turn, are “most inseparable from the soul, and can be resolv’d into no other.” The properties which determine the object of pride and humility are in fact inseparable from the soul and not resolvable into other properties.

4. Turning from the object of the passions to their cause, we may ask whether they are natural and/or original. The author finds that they are natural, as is evidenced by the fact that the same causes produce these passions in persons of all nations and ages. We would expect the same causes to produce pride or humility in any stranger we might encounter. What little variation there is among people is attributed to differences in tempers and complexions. “Can we imagine it possible, that while human nature remains the same, men will ever become entirely indifferent to their power, riches, beauty or personal merit, and that their pride and vanity will not be affected by these advantages?”

5. On the other hand, the [specific] causes of pride and humility are not original. The author remarks concerning the [specific] causes that “’tis utterly impossible they shou’d each of them be adapted to these passions by a particular provision, and primary constitution, of nature.” One reason for this impossibility is that there is a vast number of objects serve as causes of pride and humility. Moreover, the causes of these passions are quite often the product of artifice, or some arbitrary occurrence, or even luck. “Industry produces houses, furniture, cloaths. Caprice determines their particular kinds and qualities. And good fortune frequently contributes to all this, by discovering the effects that result from the different mixtures and combinations of bodies.” These effects were not provided for by nature, and it is absurd to think that each one itself was “the object of an original principle, which till then lay conceal’d in the soul, and is only by accident at last brought to light.” A final consideration is that if the properties of the causes were natural, then there would be a separate property for each different kind of cause. But the author deems it absurd that there would be a different property inducing pride in the production of a fine scitiore [cabinet with a built-in desk] from one which made one proud of producing handsome tables and chairs. The author concludes that there must be something in common among them, “on which their efficacy depends.”

6. When we investigate nature, we find its effects to be governed by a small number of simple principles. This should apply a fortiori to the human mind, as it is “so confin’d a subject may justly be thought incapable of containing such a monstrous heap of principles,” which would be required if each cause of the passions involved a different property.

7. As with natural philosophy, moral philosophy should seek the most economical explanation. Heretofore it has been in the condition of pre-Copernican astronomers, who contrived intricate systems of the heavens, thereby violating their maxim that “nature does nothing in vain.” Invention of new principles for every new phenomenon proves that the resulting principles are not “just,” and can be explained by the fact “that we only desire, by a number of falsehoods, to cover our ignorance of the truth.”

Dissertation II: Of the Passions

The notions of natural and original properties of the object and causes of pride and humility do not appear in the Dissertation. Hume does assert that the object must be the self: “Whatever we are proud of must, in some manner, belong to us. It is always our knowledge, our sense, beauty, possessions, family, on which we value ourselves” (Section II).

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