1. A new set of duties, concerning neighboring states, arises when civil government has been generally established and societies have been formed nearby one another. These duties govern the commerce between states. Nations resemble individuals in the sense that they require mutual assistance, and “their selfishness and ambition are perpetual sources of war and discord.” But the differences between nations and persons are sufficiently great that nations regulate their behavior toward one another by a new set of rules, the laws of nations. Some of the duties stemming from these laws are as follows:

• Diplomatic immunity (“the sacredness of the persons of ambassadors”),
• Declaration of war,
• Abstention of use of poisonous weapons.

2. These duties are “super-added” to the three fundamental laws of justice (stability of possession, transference by consent, and performance of promises), but the duties based on these laws are not thereby abolished. They in fact advance our interests (of peace, commerce, and alliances, respectively). So we extend to kingdoms the three laws of justice that we extend to individuals.

3. The author notes that the practice of rules of all ages has authorized the maxim that “there is a system of morals calculated for princes, much more free than that which ought to govern private persons.” (The princes themselves do not, of course, explicitly call attention to this maxim.) The difference is not in what the moral obligations are, but rather that the obligations do not have the same degree of force in the two cases. They “may lawfully be transgres’d from a more trivial motive” by the rulers than the by ruled. While this claim will appear “shocking” to some philosophers, it can be defended easily on the author’s principles.

4. The activities of the princes that the author has in mind are those involving the relations of governments to one another. The interest we have in forming relations with other nations are not essential, in contrast the interest which leads us to we form relations among ourselves within a nation. Without the latter kind of relations, “’tis utterly impossible for human nature ever to subsist.” So, we give more leeway to a prince who breaks his word to another prince than to an ordinary citizen who breaks his word of honor to another person.

5. It might be asked how much leeway should be given to the prince in comparison to that given to the subject within his jurisdiction. The author believes that no precise answer can be given to this question, and the proportion may not be quantified. “One may safely affirm, that this proportion finds itself, without any art or study of men; as we may observe on many other occasions.” We are taught more by “the practice of the world” than by “the most subtile philosophy, that was ever invented.” The author takes this primacy of observation of practice over the theorizing of philosophy to be “a convincing proof” of his fundamental thesis that everyone has an implicit notion of the rules that govern natural justice and civil justice, and that they recognize that these rules are based solely on human conventions and our interest in preserving peace and order. The fact that we relax the rules for princes when they interact with one another is explained by the fact that our interest in these actions is not as great as our interest in domestic behavior.

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