by G. J. Mattey
Book 3
Of MORALS
PART 3
Of the other virtues and vices.
Sect. 4. Of natural abilities.
1. All ethical systems distinguish between natural abilities and moral virtues. The former are placed on the same basis as bodily endowments and are said to have no moral worth. To dispute this would be to dispute about the use of the term ‘moral.’ What is important is that even if they are not of the same kind, “they agree in the most material circumstances.” Both are mental qualities, produce pleasure, and procure the love and esteem of mankind. People place a much higher value on their sense and knowledge than they do on their temperance and sobriety, and most regard it as highly as honor or courage. They are worried that certain other virtues, such as mild-mannerliness, might obscure their good sense and so boast of debauchery to show their “fire and spirit.” The figure a person cuts in society depends almost as much on sense and knowledge than on any other character trait. If he has the best intentions in the world, he will not be much regarded without them. “Since then natural abilities, tho’, perhaps, inferior, yet are on the same footing, both as to their causes ad effects, with those qualities which we call moral virtues, why shou’d we make any distinction betwixt them?”
2. It may be said that the approval given to natural abilities is inferior to that given moral virtues, and that the two are somewhat different. “But this, in my opinion, is not a sufficient reason for excluding them from the catalogue of virtues.” The author illustrates his claim by appeal to a description by Sallust of the characters of Julius Caesar and the stern Stoic Cato. There are differences among the moral virtues themselves: the thought of Caesar produces love and is amiable, while that of Cato produces esteem and inspires awe. We would like a friend the character of Caesar while we would like ourselves to be like Cato. So, the difference in the feelings produced by natural abilities may not be so different as to force us to classify the abilities as of a different species from the virtues. There is a corresponding difference in the kind of approbation produced by the abilities: “Good sense and genius beget esteem: Wit and humour excite love.” The author notes in footnote 88 that love and esteem are the same passion at bottom, arising from similar causes. The difference is that with esteem, there is a more severe pleasure, a greater object, leaving a stronger impression, or the production of humility or awe. Benevolence is connected more eminently with love than with esteem.
3. Another reason for separating natural abilities from virtues is that abilities are said to arise involuntarily, while virtues arise from liberty and free will. The author has three responses. 1) The so-called (by all moralists, but especially the ancients) moral virtues are “equally involuntary and necessary, with the qualities of the judgment and imagination.” All the qualities that comprise the great man, constancy, fortitude, magnanimity, are involuntary, as are most other character traits: “It being almost impossible for the mind to change its character in any considerable article, or cure itself of a passionate or splenetic temper, when they are natural to it.” Also, the more extreme these passions are, the more blameworthy they are, while at the same time they are less voluntary. 2) What reason is there to say that virtues are voluntary? What makes them what they are is the feeling of pleasure or pain they evoke, and these do not depend on their being voluntary. 3) Free-will has been shown in not to apply to the actions of men, or to their characters. “It is not a just consequence, that what is voluntary is free. Our actions are more voluntary than our judgments; but we have not more liberty in the one than in the other.”
4. The distinction between the voluntary and involuntary at least explains why moralists have made the false distinction between natural abilities and moral virtues. It has been observed that natural abilities “are almost invariable by any art or industry,” while virtues (and especially actions issuing from virtuous characters) can be affected by “the motives of reward and punishment, praise and blame.” This has led “legislators, and divines, and moralists” to try to regulate behavior by producing additional motives to be virtuous in whatever matters that concern them. “They knew, that to punish a man for folly, or to exhort him to be prudent and sagacious, wou’d have but little effect’ tho’ the same punishments and exhortations, with regard to justice and injustice, might have a considerable influence.” Common men do not make this distinction, but count as virtue only what pleases them. And prudence has been regarded as a virtue by those “whose judgment is not perverted by a strict adherence to a system,” particularly by the ancients, who put it at the head of the list. Philosophers account for the state of mind that excites the sentiment of esteem and approbation, when it is “in its perfect state and condition.” The grammarian is concerned with what to call or not to call virtue, and this is not as easy a task as it first appears to be.
5. Natural abilities tend to be esteemed because of their usefulness to those who have them. Prudence and discretion, not merely good intentions, are required to bring our projects to completion. Humans are superior to other animals because of their greater reasoning abilities, and great differences between them also are found among people. We owe to reason all the advantages that our manipulation of the world brings us, and if fortune is not bad, the prudent and sagacious gain most of these advantages.
6. When we compare qualities of mind, such as clarity of thought and inventiveness (among others the author lists), the answer is always going to be based on which are most useful for one’s undertakings in the world.
7. This is used for the classification of a number of virtues: industry, perseverance, patience, activity, vigilance, application, constancy, temperance, frugality, economy, resolution, and vices: prodigality, luxury, irresolution, uncertainty, according to their “advantage in the conduct of life.”
8. So far, the emphasis has been on useful natural abilities. The author now turns to those which are immediately agreeable. Some are immediately agreeable to others (wit, eloquence) and others because they are so to ourselves (good humor). “’Tis evident, that the conversation of a man of wit is very satisfactory; as a chearful good-humor’d companion diffuses a joy over the whole company, from a sympathy with his gaiety. These qualities, therefore, being agreeable, they naturally beget love and esteem, and answer to all the characters of virtue.”
9. The merit, which may be considerable, derived from conversation is based on the pleasure it gives to those hearing it. We cannot always tell what it is that makes some people’s conversation agreeable and others’ distasteful. Whatever it is, it is the same quality which makes books agreeable or distasteful, because “conversation is a transcript of the mind as well as books”.
10. Another virtue along these lines is cleanliness, because it makes us agreeable to others, engendering love and affection. Negligence in this is a fault (smaller vice), and the origin of the displeasure is “the uneasy sensation, which it excites in others.” From this seemingly trivial case, we can “clearly discover the origin of the moral distinction of vice and virtue in other instances.”
11. There is something hard to describe that makes the handsome and agreeable lead to approval. To explain this, we might have recourse to “a certain sense, which acts without reflection, and regards not the tendencies of qualities or characters.” [Shaftesbury and Hutcheson] attribute all sentiments of virtue to this moral sense. “Their hypothesis is very plausible.” The only way to counter it is to show that particular virtues do not arise in this way. But what we find instead is that almost all the virtues tend to produce a strong feeling of approval. “We cannot doubt, after this, that qualities are approv’d of, in proportion to the advantage, which results from them.”
12. We judge characters with respect to the degree of decorum they have relative to their age and circumstances. It makes the imagination uneasy to see an elderly person behave without decorum, since we are accustomed to seeing people lose their levity when they get older.
13. Memory is the faculty of the soul which is least connected to character, and therefore to virtue and vice. We ordinarily do not notice variations in it, unless someone has it or lacks it in the extreme. We do not praise or blame people with ordinary memories for having them. People go so far as to affect a bad memory in order get praise for their inventiveness. On the other hand, we should give memory more credit: truth in clarity in recalling ideas seems as valuable as in forming new ones. The only difference the author can find is that in memory, there is a lack of the feeling of extraordinary pleasure that arises from present judgment, when it is “exerted in any eminent degree.” “The sympathy with this utility and pleasure bestows a merit on the understanding; and the absence of it makes us consider the memory as a faculty very indifferent to praise or blame.”
14. A further reason why natural abilities are esteemed is because they add importance and weight to the character of the person. “He becomes of greater consequence in life,” as what he resolves to do and does affects more people, and his friendship or enmity are more momentous. “And ’tis easy to observe, that whoever is elevated, after this manner, above the rest of mankind, must excite in us the sentiments of esteem and approbation. Whatever is important engages our attention, fixes our thought, and is contemplated with satisfaction.” This is why stories of the great men and empires of the past are more agreeable: because they produce strong passions through sympathy. So it is for the esteem we pay to extraordinarily gifted people. Because of the strong mark they make on the world, they excite our passions and esteem, “unless other circumstances of his character render him odious and disagreeable.”
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