1. The author expresses his hope that he has not omitted anything necessary for an “accurate proof of this system of ethics.” We are certain of the following things: sympathy is a powerful principle in human nature, it has a great influence on our sense of beauty and on judgments of morality. Acting alone, sympathy “has force sufficient to give us the strongest sentiments of approbation,” which accounts for the virtues of justice, allegiance, chastity, and good manners. Most of the virtues which mostly tend to the good of society or of the person who possesses them contain everything needed for the operation of sympathy. All in all, sympathy is the chief source of our moral distinctions. Any objections to using it as an explanatory principle hold equally well against all rival principles. The only reason we approve of justice is its tendency to produce public good, which is only of interest to us through sympathy. The same may be presumed to hold for the other virtues tied to public good. “They must derive all their merit from our sympathy with those, who reap any advantage from them: As the virtues, which have a tendency to the good of the person possess’d of them, derive their merit from our sympathy with them.”

2. Most people will recognize that those qualities of the mind that are virtuous because useful need no other explanation but utility. This is a natural and frequent way of thinking. And it forces us to acknowledge the force of sympathy. “Virtue is consider’d as means to an end. Means to an end are only valu’d so far as the end is valu’d. But the happiness of strangers affects us by sympathy alone.” The approval arising from the view of the virtues directed toward the public good or private interest must, then be attributed to sympathy. “These form the most considerable part of morality.”

3. The author now departs from “solid argument” to “bribe the reader’s assent” by appeal to “topics to engage the affections.” Here, he is going for the heart rather than the head. We are all lovers of virtue in speculation (though perhaps degenerate in practice). As such we are pleased by the location of the source of these virtues in sympathy, “so noble a source, which gives us a just notion both of the generosity and capacity of our nature.” A sense of morals, inherent in the soul, is one of the most powerful principles in the soul. The sense of morals is reinforced by the approval we get by reflection on its source (sympathy), and it has just been shown that we do approve of the source as having “nothing but what is great and good” in it. A system of morality which does not trace the moral sense to its source, but instead considers it as original instincts in the human mind, can “defend the cause of virtue with sufficient authority.” The author’s system has the advantage that not only is the virtue approved of, but the sense of virtue is as well, not to mention the principles from which the sense is derived (extensive sympathy with mankind). “So that nothing is presented on any side, but what is laudable and good.”

4. The observation about the approval of the source of virtue applies to the artificial virtues, such as justice. The sense of the morality of justice is natural. An act of justice is beneficial to society due to “the combination of men, in a system of conduct.” We approve of it naturally once we recognize the tendency. If we did not naturally approve of it in this way, “’tis impossible any combination or convention cou’d ever produce that sentiment.”

5. An objection might be that as an invention, justice would follow the road to degeneracy of most human inventions. Since they depend on “humor [mood] and caprice,” they become in vogue for a while and are then forgotten. But the generality of the interest involved with justice is as great as possible, involving all of humanity, and all times and places, so it is not a passing fad. Moreover, there is no other invention that could do the work justice does. Add to this that “it is obvious, and discovers itself on the very first formation of society.” This makes the rules of justice “as immutable as human nature.” The author compares his system with one in which the sense of justice is an original instinct. This kind of system would make justice no more stable.

6. In this last paragraph of the Treatise, the author departs from his general approach for a moment. He extols the happiness and dignity of virtue, which his system can account for. Every principle of human nature is interested in virtue. Acquisition of knowledge, for example, is not only useful in its own right, but wins us esteem and approbation of others. A person who would transgress the laws of justice for some advantage cannot really bear thinking about himself, due to the disapproval the transgression brings from others and the lack of satisfaction it will bring to himself. The author compares his work to that of an anatomist, who presents all the minute details without trying to make them beautiful. Indeed, there is something hideous about them, which the painter conceals to produce a beautiful portrait. But the anatomist can give advice to the painter--advice which is necessary for excellence in the art. “We must have an exact knowledge of the parts, their situation and connexion, before we can design with any elegance or correctness.” The “most abstract speculations concerning human nature” may be “cold and unentertaining,” but the make practical morality more correct in what it prescribes and more persuasive when it exhorts people to be virtuous.

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