Context

The goal is to explain the origin of the passions of pride and humility. Thus far, the author has claimed that the self is the object of these passions, and that there are a variety of disparate causes thereof. In the previous section, he pointed to a common feature of those causes. The idea of the cause is related to the idea of the self, and the impression caused by the former idea resembles that which accompanies the latter. This section shows how this common feature operates.

Background

The author’s account at this point is original.

The Treatise

1. Having established his principles “on unquestionable experience,” the author turns to the question of their application. His method will be to examine all the causes of pride and humility, with an eye to both the operative qualities of the causes and the subjects in which the qualities inhere. What the operative qualities of all the causes of pride and humility have in common is their production of the sensations of pleasure and pain, respectively. At this point, the author supposes, without proof, “that every cause of pride, by its peculiar qualities, produces a separate pleasure, and of humility a separate uneasiness.”

2. As far as the subject that has these qualities is concerned, it is supposed by the author, on the basis of “many obvious instances,” to be “either parts of ourselves, or something nearly related to us.” The good and bad qualities of our own actions or manners, which constitute virtue and vice, help give rise to pride and humility, respectively. These qualities in fact “determine our personal character, than which nothing operates more strongly on the passions.” The beauty or deformity of our own bodies, houses, furniture, etc. have similar effects. On the other hand, “the same qualities, when transfer’d to subjects which bear us no relation, influence not in the smallest degree either of these affections.”

3. The remaining question is how the passions themselves correspond to the supposed production of pleasure or pain by the qualities of the subject and close relation of the subject to ourselves. The first aspect of the passions is one that had been noted in Section 3, that the direction of our thought by the passions to ourselves is original, something for which the author does not give a reason. He describes it as an “original and natural instinct,” and declares it impossible that the passion not be directed to the self, based on “the primary constitution of the mind.”

4. The second quality of pride and humility, also taken to be original, is that pride is pleasurable and humility is painful, and that when the pleasure or pain are removed, the passion is removed as well. “Of this our very feeling convinces us; and beyond our feeling, ’tis here in vain to reason or dispute.”

5. Given the just-“established” qualities of the passions and the above suppositions about the cause of the passions, the true system “breaks in upon me with irresistible evidence.”

That cause [the beautiful house, which incites a feeling of pleasure], which [it is supposed] excites the passion [pride], is related to the object, which [it is established that] nature has attributed to the passion [the self: it is my house]; the sensation [pleasure], which [it is supposed] the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation which [it is established is] the sensation of the passion [the pleasure of pride]: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv’d.

6. The nature of the human mind in producing pride is explained. The “organs of the human mind” are disposed to produce the impression or emotion of pride. The idea of the self is at the same time assigned to the emotion. This claim is bolstered by an analogy. In the case of lust and hunger, first, the body is disposed to convey under certain circumstances sensations of lust and hunger to the mind, second, the sensations produce the appropriate idea of the objects of the appetite [e.g., a human body or food].

These two circumstances are united in pride. The organs are so dispos’d as to produce the passion [pride]; and the passion, after its production, naturally produces a certain idea [of the self]. All this needs not proof. ’Tis evident we never shou’d be possest of that passion, were there not a disposition of mind proper for it; and ’tis as evident, that the passion always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances.

7. The author now poses a new question: are the passions produced immediately by nature, or are they produced in co-operation with other causes? Here he claims that the answer to this question is different for different passions, as well as different sensations. Consider the sensation of enjoying food: there must be an external object (the food) for the sensation to exist. On the other hand, the sensation of hunger arises internally. Pride resembles “relish,“ as it requires the assistance of an external object and does not result from an original “internal movement” like the movement of the heart. The argument for this claim is as follows. First, it is confirmed by daily experience, which never reveals pride without something excellent to be proud of being or having. Second, we would be proud all the time if pride had an internal origin, since the object of pride (the self) is always the same, and there is no special generator of pride in us, as there is for hunger and thirst. Third, since humility is in the same position as pride, it would always be generated as well, in which case we would always be both humble and proud, or else these two passions would cancel each other out from the very start. [Compare Section 2 above.]

8. If the cause of pride is not to be found in an internal principle, what can it be? Having examined many causes, the author discovers that there are two common factors in all of them: “that of themselves they [the causes] produce an impression, ally’d to the passion, and are plac’d on a subject, ally’d to the object of the passion.” The impression is one of pleasure, and the cause of the pleasure is related either to the self or to something related to the self. “Any thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for object.”

9. The same holds for humility, mutatis mutandis, substituting uneasiness for agreeableness [or pleasure]. But pride and humility have the same object (the self), “so that ’tis requisite only to change the relation of impressions, without making any change upon that of ideas.” A beautiful house I own produces pride at first, but humility when it becomes run-down; the initial pleasure is turned to pain. “The double relation between the ideas and impressions subsists in both cases, and produces an easy transition from the one emotion to the other.”

10. The author now summarizes his account of the two passions. Recall from Section 4 that there are two relevant principles of association: one between ideas and one between impressions, and that the association of ideas can facilitate the association of impressions. One association of ideas is between some object and the object of the passion. Suppose that there is some kind of causal relation between my house and myself as the owner of the house. Then the thought of the house leads naturally to the thought of myself. This is the first relation of perceptions that figures into the account. The second relation is between impressions which are directed at the objects of the two ideas: a feeling of pleasure regarding the house and a feeling of pleasure regarding myself. The trigger for the passion of pride is the original idea and its attendant impression. The idea of my house gives rise to an impression of pleasure. The idea stands in the first relation to another idea, that of myself. For me to be proud of my house, there must be another impression of pleasure: this one directed to myself (the same object to which the first idea is directed). This is the second relation, and it must be accounted for. The second pleasure is associated with the first one because it parallels the association between the idea of the house and the idea of myself. The house is related to me, and the pleasure in the house is related to pleasure with myself. As the author puts it, nature has bestowed an attraction on ideas and impressions, so that on the introduction of the attraction of ideas, there is an attraction of impressions. Putting it all together, the first relation (of ideas) gives rise to a second relation (of impressions), and the second impression is said to be the product of a double relation. “When an idea [of a beautiful house] produces an impression [a pleasure], related to an impression [a pleasure] which is connected with an idea, related to the first idea [myself, owning the house], these two impressions must be in a manner inseparable, nor will the one in any case be unattended with the other.”

11. The section is concluded with an illustration: a comparison with the explanation of pride and the explanation of the belief formed from judgments of causation. An impression (say, of a cause) creates a vivacity in the imagination, and the causal relation conveys that vivacity to an associated idea (of its effect) by means of an easy transition between the impression and the idea. Both the impression (to excite the mind into action in forming the judgment) and the causal relation itself (to direct its activity beyond the impression to an idea) are required. [This single relation, so to speak, works through the same basic mechanism as the double relation that gives rise to the passion.] “There is evidently a great analogy betwixt that hypothesis, and our present one of an impression and an idea, that transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation: Which analogy must be allow’d to be no despicable proof of both hypotheses.” In both cases, there is a production in the mind, a belief or a passion, which is the outcome of a natural process of association. The fact that the same explanation applies to both cases makes it more likely that both explanations are correct.

Dissertation II: Of the Passions

Having noted the principles of association between impression and impression, and idea and idea, Hume applies them to the case of the passions of pride and humility. The task is to explain the “easy transition” between the original impression and the idea of the self. “Where this connexion is wanting, no object can either excite pride or humility; and the more you weaken the connexion, the more you weaken the passion” ( Section II). This gives rise to three questions, whether: (1) every case of pride and humility involves a similar impression, (2) the cause of the passion excites an impression similar to the kind found in the passions, (3) whether there is an easy transition between the impression excited by the cause of the passion and that found in its effect, the passion itself. In fact, pleasure is always found in pride and pain in humility, and pleasure is induced by the cause of the passion. [And, given the principle of association between like impressions, there is an easy transition between the two impressions.] “[W]e must allow, in that case, that the present theory is fully proved and ascertained. The double relation of ideas and sentiments will be acknowledged incontestable.”

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